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ABSTRACT 
The Arabian Gulf is a strategically significant region of the world with regard to the 
global energy supply chain as well as maritime trade and commerce. For the past three 
decades, the region and Strait of Hormuz, in particular, have witnessed major crisis, wars, 
and foreign intervention which lead to undermine the stability, peace, and security of the 
region. Since the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Iran found propitious opportunity to 
pursue a regional hegemony. In the name of its national security, nuclear ambitions, and 
protection of its self-interests, Iran has repeatedly threatened international passage, 
disrupted maritime shipping and interrupted oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz. On 
the other side, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has pursued a collective security 
approach to achieve balanced outcomes ensuring free oil flow, supporting stability, and 
maintaining security in this region. Despite these efforts, the situation remains 
tumultuous, confrontational and uncertain; therefore, the GCC must consider strategic 
alternatives to establish regional balance of power, achieve a sustainable stability, and 
ensure security in the Arabian Gulf region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Arabian Gulf, which is also known as the Persian Gulf, is a strategically 
important region of the world with regard to the global energy supply chain, as well as 
maritime trade and commerce. Any Iranian actions that disrupt commercial access to the 
Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz will be globally significant. Therefore, in order to 
assess the consequences associated with the risk to regional and global prosperity, it is 
necessary to provide an extensive threat analysis of Iran’s historical conduct and 
anticipated future behavior.  
On the other hand, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an agent that seeks to 
prevent and resolve disruptions to maritime traffic in this strategically important 
international shipping region. The GCC must evaluate both short and long-term 
alternatives, including options that address complex considerations of member states and 
global customers.  
The role of the GCC is critical to effective risk management. A comprehensive 
approach based on an assessment of threat and consequence is necessary to anticipate, 
evaluate, and counter potential rogue actions by Iran intended to delay or halt maritime 
traffic through the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, this thesis will 
focus on the following major research question:  
What are the GCC’s strategic alternatives in case of suspension of maritime traffic 
in the Arabian Gulf as a result of the Iranian threat in attempting to close the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This study is intended to provide an enhanced understanding and perspective of 
the true conditions that exist in the Arabian Gulf with the hope that an appropriate 
solution can be found.  Given the various attempts in the past to address serious threats 
posed by rogue actions in the region, the prospects for success rely on a clear 
understanding of the actual conditions, and any solution must be based upon these 
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conditions.  Devising alternative courses of action based upon a contemporary analysis of 
realistic scenarios would serve as an ideal case study for researchers who seek an 
understanding of regional political dynamics—or for policy makers whose might obtain 
insight from a comparative study. 
Furthermore, this study serves to enrich knowledge in strategic studies.  The 
situation in the Arabian Gulf, past and present, presents an ideal case study for those 
concerned with national and global security. The role of the GCC and its approach to 
decision-making is strategic in nature. Any aggressive event that happens in this region 
would have a profound economic effect on the nations concerned, and compel those in 
the regional governments to unify and select the appropriate courses of action from a 
portfolio of options.  
It is important to understand how events in the Arabian Gulf—and the Strait of 
Hormuz, in particular—could cause regional and global crises whose implications could 
not only affect economies, but also could lead to mobilizing military forces. This thesis 
will provide analysis of the maritime security situation in the Arabian Gulf to enhance the 
reader’s understanding of regional tensions associated with past Iranian attempts to 
threaten the maritime traffic and assets in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. 
Finally, it will specify pathways to both short-term and long-term strategic alternatives 
that could be implemented to address threats and resolve them. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The chapters and sections of this thesis pose significant questions and identify 
problems that would need to be addressed by the GCC. Such questions include the 
following: 
(1) What is the importance of a geographic global choke point, in general; and 
why has the Arabian Gulf and its crucial entrance, the Strait of Hormuz, become an issue 
of eminent global concern? 
(2) What is the internationally-recognized legal provision regarding straits within 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? What does 
international law say about the status of the strait, and how should all parties concerned 
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regard the Strait of Hormuz, with particular regard to positions taken by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran regarding their territorial boundaries? 
(3) What are the implications, regional and global, in cases where the Iranian 
regime attempts to threaten international passage in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of 
Hormuz? What is the likelihood that Iran, in the name of its national security, nuclear 
ambitions, and protection of its self-interests, would close or block the maritime 
navigation in the Strait of Hormuz if threatened or pressured by superpower countries to 
suspend its nuclear program?   
 (4) What is the historic and future role of the Gulf Cooperation Council? How 
would the GCC pursue collective security to achieve a balanced outcome? Would the 
positions it takes create critical political and economic implications for the Gulf States, 
who are the major regional parties concerned, as well as the rest of the world? Who 
would be affected by the resulting oil and gas energy crisis, and how would it impact 
maritime security and trade in the short and long term? 
(5) What are the strategic alternatives of the GCC to achieve a sustainable 
stability in the Arabian Gulf that ensures safe shipping for global trade and transfer of 
oil? 
The Arabian Gulf region is considered the world’s largest oil reservoir, supplying 
more than thirty percent of the produced oil for the entire globe.1 The statistics presented 
indicate a significant increase in global demand for oil, as they show that the world 
consumed more than 85 million barrel per day (mbpd) in 2010, and is projected to reach 
105 mbpd by 2030.2  
In addition to its nuclear ambitions, Iran purportedly seeks to achieve regional 
hegemony in the Arabian Gulf by disrupting the global oil supply and maritime 
commerce. It is a desirable target because the revenue of countries around this region is 
largely generated from the oil and maritime trade, which has established and enhanced 
strong international political and economic relations. This threat would have negative 
                                                 
1 Mustafa Alani, “Toward a Comprehensive Maritime Security Arrangement in the Gulf.” Middle 
East: 31. 
2 World Oil Outlook, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC, 2010. 10. 
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consequences, mainly in the international economy.  If the U.S. were to withdraw 
military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, the power vacuum created would allow Iran to 
seek and exercise greater influence in the region. The GCC should aim to promote 
regional stability by enhancing the collective security, and help maintain the stability and 
economic prosperity, of the Arabian Gulf region. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to answer the questions posed in this thesis, a qualitative methodology 
would be the most appropriate approach. It provides an inductive analysis of evidence to 
support the alternatives. Through this process, each argument can be subjectively 
analyzed through the examination of data, which also provides support for assumptions 
made.  
Data shall be collected from both primary and secondary sources. The sources 
include government proceedings, such as national security briefings (declassified), and 
press releases or statements from the government agencies concerned. Furthermore, this 
study shall include a broad selection of sources, including: books, journals, articles, 
newspapers, and magazines that describe past and present issues, viewpoints, 
perspectives, and conditions of the region. Using a descriptive qualitative approach, this 
thesis shall also highlight significant facts about the Strait of Hormuz, and to a certain 
extent, the Arabian Gulf region as a whole. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The Arabian Gulf is a strategically significant region of the world with regard to 
the global energy supply chain as well as to the maritime trade and commerce. For 
instance, Japan receives 80% of its oil from this region. The oil, liquefied gas, crew, 
passengers, and cargo containers with goods are transported through various types of 
ships via the Strait of Hormuz. In opposition to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Iran has periodically issued challenges to the right of 
international passage, suggesting that claims of sovereignty should prevail. This was 
confirmed by a statement from the head of the Revolutionary Guards General 
Mohammad Ali Jafari: 
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In light of the strategic position of the Strait of Hormuz, this issue has 
never been taken off the agenda…We have not stopped there... we are 
seeking to use our defense capabilities in open waters…This means that 
should the enemy try to pose a threat against the Islamic republic from 
outside the Strait of Hormuz, we will have the power to retaliate in kind. 
This strategy is now on our agenda.3 
As an economic consequence, the world’s energy supply chain could be 
significantly disrupted—at any time—if the Strait of Hormuz was closed to shipping. 
Diplomatic and military consequences may be employed in the event of a confrontation. 
Maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to the economic health in 
the region, and the globe if we consider how the world is economically interdependent. 
This thesis will evaluate the supply chain and the global strategies that consumer nations 
have adopted to ensure energy security. Would the economic analysis considered by 
GCC decision-makers include costs associated with disruptions of the supply chain for 
commodities movement world-wide, or would it be limited to the direct costs and short-
term impacts to the Gulf States? The economic analysis will include a description of past, 
present, and projected future shipping movements through the region. This is intended to 
reinforce the economic importance of open and free international passage.  
Except where inclusion of such information serves to explain cultural attitudes or 
describe economic impacts, the environmental elements associated with UNCLOS and 
commerce will not be included within the scope of this thesis. However, a description of 
the commercial supply chain from production to delivery will be outlined. Particular 
detail will be provided to emphasize how the Strait of Hormuz is a geographic “choke 
point” for shipping lanes on approach and departure, to give the reader an appreciation of 
its vulnerability. 
Currently, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) represents six states of the 
Arabian Gulf.4 This thesis will examine the charter, membership, and historic activities 
of the GCC. It will assess cultural factors that influence decision-making by members, 
                                                 
3 Iran Guards ready to close Strait of Hormuz," Inside of Iran, accessed August 18, 2011. Accessed 
August 18, 2011. http://www.insideofiran.org/en/categoryblog/1753-iran-guards-ready-to-close-strait-of-
hormuz.html  
4 GCC was established in May 25th, 1981 and included the following six Arab states located along 
the Arabian Gulf: Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. 
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consider how consensus is reached, and examine how regional leadership has overcome 
past confrontations involving international passage in the Strait of Hormuz. It will pose 
the question: historically, have the individual personalities of the GCC members played a 
significant role in developing consensus, or does the GCC charter and operating 
procedures provide a robust and nimble foundation for decision-making that transcends 
human factors? 
Examining the background of relations with Iran is important to understanding all 
options that the GCC has at its disposal.  Iran’s historic relationships with Arabian, as 
well as contemporary conditions internal to the country, serve to provide useful 
information for decision-makers who may be impacted by threats to shipping in the 
region. This thesis will discuss the importance of these relationships, and analyze how 
Iran’s behavior and attitude has been managed when commercial passage through the 
Strait of Hormuz was threatened.  
Various diplomatic options are available to the GCC. The council’s ability to 
achieve consensus depends on the politics of the day, economic conditions, and complex 
relationships between individual states. Some considerations are expressed publicly, 
other are only discussed privately.  Both have an influence on the amount of time it takes 
to achieve consensus. The process depends upon a variety of social, economic, and 
political considerations. Does the GCC decision-making process balance the interests of 
the region with short and long-term global energy security concerns? Are its activities 
acceptable to the cultures within the Gulf States and synchronized with the rest of the 
world's commercial maritime community? Because a detailed analysis of these factors is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the analysis will be limited to those factors that influence 
consensus in a case study presented later in this thesis. 
What are the best options to regional partners faced with contemporary threats to 
the global energy supply chain posed by a marine traffic stoppage through the Arabian 
Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz? This thesis will discuss short-term alternatives as well as 
long-term strategies. Opportunities for strategic investment and economic partnership 
will be considered. To reinforce discussion of the various options and selection of an 
approach, lessons learned from past events will be presented in a case study for a 
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hypothetical event. Social, economic, and cultural elements presented early in this thesis 
will be integrated into the scenario to reinforce the importance of these considerations 
made by GCC members. Issues of varying urgency and sensitivity will be presented, 
serving to demonstrate to the reader how quickly and effectively the body might respond 
to a variety of important priorities. It will identify potential limitations.  It will also assess 
some of the risks associated with ineffective decision-making by the GCC and 
subsequent actions individual states might make to protect regional prosperity. 
In conclusion, this thesis will summarize the importance of the Strait of Hormuz 
and reiterate the risk to regional and global prosperity posed by any Iranian actions to 
disrupt commercial access to it.  It will provide an analysis of Iran’s historic conduct and 
anticipated future behavior. It will evaluate the potential of the GCC as an agent for the 
prevention and resolution of disruptions to maritime traffic in this strategically important 
international shipping passage. It will discuss alternatives available to the GCC, both 
short and long-term, including the costs and benefits associated with each proposed 
solution.  Finally, it will summarize options to be considered by member states and global 
customers to more effectively anticipate, evaluate, and counter future rogue actions by 
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II. THE MOST IMPORTANT GLOBAL CHOKEPOINT “STRAIT 
OF HORMUZ” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
  The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway connecting the Arabian Gulf 
region—which has the largest production and reserves of oil in the world—to global 
markets. The strait is the only passage for oil tankers from the Gulf to other parts of the 
world. Therefore, the developed industrial countries have a strategic interest in the strait. 
Through the strait passes more than two-thirds of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) production. The emergence of oil production increased the 
importance of the region as the world became economically integrated and 
interdependent due to globalization and technology. Thus, any interruption of Gulf oil or 
closure of the strait, depriving the world of over 8 million barrels of oil daily, would lead 
to a global crisis in the lack of energy supply and an increase in world market prices.  
 There are eight countries located on the Arabian Gulf: Iraq, Iran, and the six Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and 
the U.A.E. These states have developed maritime ports for maritime transportation, 
shipping industry, fishing, and international trade. The eight countries have used oil and 
gas revenues in huge and intensive projects such as building internal security forces, 
infrastructure programs, petrochemicals, ships industry, and ports expansion. This 
development allowed for further increases in the amount of trade with regional countries. 
A large number of oil, gas, and bulk tankers navigate through the strait. It is also difficult 
to navigate in the Arabian Gulf for several reasons: the high density of shipping traffic, 
the shallow depths ranging from 150 to 350 feet, the presence of many islands in the sea 
routes, and the scattered offshore oil/gas platforms and pipelines. 
The oil wealth and revenue in the Gulf region and the strait of Hormuz has 
generated internal disputes as well as conflicts between the states. In general, the region 
has witnessed critical events that affected the oil market and were critical threats to 
energy security. Such events were: Iranian oil nationalism under Mosaddegh (1951), the 
Iranian revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the invasion of Kuwait (1990), 
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the 9/11 attacks (2001), and the invasion of Iraq (2003). The region has become one of 
the most unstable areas in the world. More recently, the Gulf region has been confronted 
with the threat of radicalism and attacks by terrorist groups or states that support those 
groups. In addition, the Iranian nuclear program threatens the stability and the security of 
the region. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRAIT TO THE ARABIAN GULF 
REGIONAL COUNTRIES 
 The regional Gulf countries realize the importance of the strait as the vital lifeline 
for exports (which is mainly the outflow of oil and gas), and imports (which is the inflow 
of goods and services in return). The importance varies from one country to another: 
Oman and UAE have alternative maritime ports in the Gulf of Oman; while Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Bahrain have no alternatives other than to use the Strait of Hormuz. In 
addition, Saudi Arabia has alternative ports on the Red Sea. Although Iran has ports in 
the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, their main oil export facilities remain within the 
Arabian Gulf. Therefore, Iran has no viable maritime oil exporting alternatives. 
 In 1968, Great Britain abandoned and relinquished its military outposts in the 
Gulf region.5 As the United States engaged in the Cold War against the Soviets, the U.S. 
established strong relations with the Gulf States to assure its national interests. 
Consequently, the U.S. presidential doctrines of Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter 
through Bush II were focused on ensuring free oil flow, supporting stability, and 
maintaining security in this region.6 This focus on the region has continued until today. 
The U.S. maintains a significant military presence in many Gulf States, such as the U.S. 
Navy Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the U.S. Air Force Central Command base in Qatar, and the 
U.S. Army base in Kuwait.7 In addition to the war on terrorism, the military presence has 
 
                                                 
5 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Gulf.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2003): 2–16. 
Accessed November 21, 2011.  http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20033645 
6 Irene Gendzier, ‘Oil, Iraq and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, Situation Analysis, no.2, 
Spring 2003, 21. http://manghani.free.fr/sa/issue2/gendzier.pdf  
7 James  A. Russell, “Regional threats and security strategy: The troubling case of today's Middle 
East,” Strategic. Studies Institute, November 20, 2007, 30. 
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also served as a balance of power to prevent any hostile state from controlling the 
resources of the region, which could be used to blackmail, manipulate, and extort the 
world.8 
C. THE ARABIAN GULF AT A GLANCE 
 The Arabian Gulf has been an important maritime region throughout history. It 
linked ancient civilizations—Mesopotamian and Indian—by sea trading. In recent 
history, this commercial importance has continued for the maritime superpowers 
concerned with this region. This common interest and its geographic location play a 
dominant role in the contemporary balance of international politics.  
 In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese, Dutch, and English realized the 
importance of the Gulf. Therefore, they began competing to dominate this part of the 
world as the best way to India. This rivalry between the colonial powers ended in favor of 
Britain, which controlled the fate of this region and its resources for a long time using 
treaties of protection with Oman and the coastal states which are known as the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). Later, Britain signed treaties of protection with Bahrain, Kuwait, 
and Qatar. Under these treaties, the British were responsible for foreign affairs and 
protection of the region, which ensured their absolute control for more than seven 
decades. After the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, Great 
Britain recognized that states should have the right to self-determination. Therefore, the 
Gulf States, which had been under British control, gained autonomy and became 
independent sovereign states.  
 The discovery and emergence of oil in this part of the world not only changed the 
social life of people in many Gulf States, but it also became the main incentive to their 
economic growth and development. In addition, the industrialized and developed nations 
of the world (e.g., the United States, Europe, Russia, China, and Japan), which obtain 
more than 70% of their oil from the Gulf, have significantly reestablished their political 
and economic linkages and relations with Gulf States, including Iraq and Iran. 
                                                 
8 Pollack, 4. 
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The geographical location and economic growth of the Gulf encouraged 
substantial direct foreign investments from international corporations to businesses in the 
region. It is presently evident that the Gulf region is highly integrated in the global 
economy9 and has become a primary international business center and main trade hub, 
especially in the fields of international shipping, port services, and industries associated 
with shipping. 
D. THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL MARITIME 
CHOKEPOINTS 
 Global maritime channels and straits form passageways and access points in the 
international navigation and sea lines of communication (SLOC). Some have emerged as 
chokepoints that have prominent and strategic importance as critical and sensitive 
locations in terms of trade, geography, and politics.10 The Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, 
Bab el-Mandeb, Bosphorus, Gibraltar, Dover, and man-made channels—Panama and 
Suez—are statistically among the most significant and busiest chokepoints. These 
bottlenecks have geographically and economically fueled the explosive growth of global 
maritime trade by linking the continents: Asia, Europe, Africa, North America, and South 
America. 
The global economy has become integrated and interdependent due to 
industrialization, globalization, and advancements in technology. Thus, any disruption of 
the maritime supply chain could lead to a substantial interruption in the flow of trade and 
shipping that would ultimately affect the global energy supply and energy prices. As a 
result, it could cause small and large-scale conflicts which would have regional and 
global economic repercussions. 
                                                 
9 Yousif Khalifa Al-Yousif, Oil Economies and Globalization: The Case of GCC Countries, 
Proceedings of the Middle East Economic Association, 6, 2004. Accessed November 18, 2011. 
http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/al-yousif.pdf  
10 Yoel Guzansky, Gallia Lindenstrauss, and Jonathan Schachter, “Power, Pirates, and Petroleum: 
Maritime Choke Points in the Middle East”, Strategic Assessment, Volume 14, No.2 (July 2011), 5. 
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E. MARITIME TRAFFIC IN THE ARABIAN GULF 
 It is worth noting that the evolution and progress in global economic growth has 
relied primarily upon sea shipping, which alone accounts for more than 80% of 
international trade.11 Seaborne trade could reach two billion tons within the next two 
decades.12 This would include the most important demand and supply commodities such 
as oil, petroleum products, gas, coal, iron ore, steel, aluminum, metals, wood, 
electrical/electronic goods, machinery, consumer/textile goods, motor vehicles, livestock, 
and agricultural commodities. The maritime chokepoints have played a vital role in this 
trade. Historically, some of these chokepoints were part of the water routes of the Silk 
Road. Many countries, such as the United States, established doctrines and air/naval 
capabilities to protect and secure their vital interests under the banner of regional security 
and stability. Many nations built huge maritime fleets—to boost their trade and 
economy—realizing the importance of the chokepoints that connect oceans and seas. For 
the volumes and quantities of tonnage shipped, international maritime transportation is 
the most cost-effective alternative when compared with land or air modes.13  
 In terms of trade routing and transit infrastructure, chokepoints are narrow 
channels that lay along heavily-used global sea routes. Some of them are so narrow that 
navigation restrictions have been established that limit the size of various vessels seeking 
passage. Experts suggest that the security of these chokepoints is a critical part of global 
energy security, owing to the high volume of oil that moves through them.14 
In the year 2009, world oil production amounted to approximately 84 million 
barrels per day, of which the United States consumed 21 million barrels, China consumed 
                                                 
11 “Review of Maritime Transport 2010,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Accessed November 11, 2011. http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5746&lang=1  
12 Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce 
Resources,” Chapter 8 in Globalization and Maritime Power, 2002. 
13 J-P Rodrigue, and Micheal Browne, Chapter 10: International Maritime Freight Movements,  in 
R.D. Knowles, J. Shaw and I. Docherty (eds) Transport Geographies: Mobilities, Flows and Spaces, 
London: Blackwell, 2008. 
14Amy Myers Jaffe, “Energy Security: Implication for U.S.-China-Middle East Relations,” 
Prepared in Conjunction with an Energy Conference Sponsored by the Shanghai Institute for International 
Studies and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.13. 
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6.4 million barrels,15 and Japan and India consumed 4.3 and 2.9 million barrels, 
respectively. About half of the 84 mbpd was moved by tankers on various fixed maritime 
routes. Historically significant decisions, such as the decision of Winston Churchill to 
switch from coal to oil as the source of energy to propel the Royal Navy ships, 16 elevated 
the global importance of oil, not only because it was an abundant source of energy, but 
also due to its widespread uses in industry and transportation. Consequently, the Arabian 
Gulf emerged as a critical region and central supply source in the global oil market and 
the emerging contemporary world economy. To date, the Gulf region has produced 
almost one-quarter of total global oil production, and presently holds almost sixty percent 
of the world’s known oil reserves and more than forty percent of the world’s gas 
reserves.17 However, the only maritime entrance or exit passage in the Arabian Gulf to 
export the oil, or import goods, is through the chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. 
 
Figure 1.   Major Chokepoints and Oil Transited at Major Strategic Locations18 
                                                 
15 Thomas D. Kraemer, Addicted to Oil: Strategic Implications of American Oil Policy, Carliste 
Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 31 May 2006. 
16 Erik J. Dahl, “Naval Innovation: from Coal to Oil,” Joint Force Quarterly 27 (Winter 2000–01): 
50–56. Accessed November 11, 2011.  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1327.pdf   
17 Daniel Yergin, The quest: energy, security and the remaking of the modern world. (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2011). 284. 
18 Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Straits, Passages and Chokepoints: A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum 
Distribution, Cahiers de Geographie du Quebec, Volume 48, number 135, pages 357 – 374.  
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F. THE MOST CRITICAL GLOBAL CHOKEPOINT:THE STRAIT OF 
HORMUZ 
The Strait of Hormuz is situated between two shores; the northern shore belongs 
to Iran and the southern shore belongs to Oman and United Arab Emirates.19 The strait 
links the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and adjoins the Arabian Sea. Due to the 
daily passage through the strait of large amounts of oil—almost 15.5 million barrels in 
2009—Hormuz has become the world’s most important oil transportation chokepoint, 
with approximately 90 ships daily.20 This includes 13–15 crude oil tankers navigating 
through it daily eastbound, and almost as many westbound.21 The region supplies major 
global markets. The Asian market, which is the most important customer for Gulf oil, 
gets nearly 75% of its total oil imports.22 The region supplies Europe with 30% of its oil 
import needs.23 The U.S imports around 22% of its oil from the Gulf, which makes up 
approximately 12% of the U.S.’s oil demand.24 The region also supplies Australia with 
almost 14% of its oil import needs.25  
The narrowest point of the strait is 21 miles across; however, each of the 
navigable shipping lanes is no more than two miles wide, divided by a two-mile buffer 
zone. The strait is deep and broad enough to accommodate the world’s largest crude oil 
tankers. Approximately two-thirds of oil shipments passing through the strait are carried 
by tankers in excess of 150,000 tons.26 
                                                 
19 Yergin, 303. 
20 Peter J. Pham, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment, American Foreign 
Policy Interests, #32, 2010, 65. 
21 Ibid, 65. 
22 Michael Richardson, Asia's Middle East Oil Dependence: Chokepoints on a Vital Maritime 
Supply Line, March 2007.  
23 Ibid, Executive Summary. 
24 Ibid, Executive Summary. 
25 ACIL Tasman, Petroleum import infrastructure in Australia – Main Report, August 2009, 4–5. 
26 U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis, “World Oil 
Transit Chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz,” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html.  
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Every year, more than 17,500 tankers and 7,300 cargo ships pass through the 
strait.27 According to analysts,28 the major ports in the Gulf region will undergo 
significant expansion and development due to the high market demand for containerized 
goods. Demand increased from 4.46 million TEU29 in 1995 to almost 15 million TEU in 
2006, which gave the Gulf the largest share of container and port development in the 
Middle East. Demand is expected to further increase by more than 40% over the next ten 
years. Hence, the Gulf region is among the most congested maritime spots in the world. 
G. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 
 Prior to the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea and the development 
of UNCLOS, the maritime nations regulated the seas under customary law and 
international agreements, known as maritime law, which that were regarded as legal 
practice and widely accepted by the majority of those nations. The law encompassed 
customs and rules to regulate the freedom of navigation on the high seas, and passage 
through territorial seas, international straits, and archipelagoes.30 An example of this is 
the three-mile limit.31 Initially, the maritime states claimed sovereignty of territorial seas 
based on the range of the protection provided by shore-based cannon towards the sea.32  
                                                 
27 Rear Adm Khan Hasham Bin Saddique, “Challenges in Indian Ocean,” Maritime Security 
(November 16, 2011). Accessed December 02, 2011.  http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-
asia/challenges-in-indian-ocean-0/  
28 Strong  container port demand outlook in the Middle East and South Asia. England: Ocean 
Shipping Consultants Ltd, 2007.  http://www.maritime-
rh.com/maritime_docs/ocs_press_releases/Containerport_Markets_ME_SA_to_2020.pdf  
29 The twenty-foot equivalent unit "TEU" is a unit of volume measurement which represents the 
cargo capacity on ships, equivalent to a 20-foot container. 
30 Steven Groves, “Accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Is Unnecessary to 
Secure U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2599, August 24, 
2011, 2.  http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/08/Accession-to-UN-Convention-Law-of-the-
Sea-Is-Unnecessary-to-Secure-U.S.-Navigational-Rights-Freedoms  
31 H. S. K. Kent, "The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit," The American Journal of 
International Law (American Society of International Law) 48 (4), 1954,  537–553. 
32 Ibid, 537–553. In addition to the range of the cannon, Kent also argued that the three-mile limit 
derived from a unit used for measurement at sea which was called a “league.” 
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 Over the years, many states developed maritime capabilities in terms of fleets and 
weapons. These states also realized the importance of the natural resources of the seas 
and oceans which adjoined their coasts. Therefore, many of them began to extend their 
sovereignty—not only over their own territorial waters, but to the waters beyond their 
territorial boundaries as well—to gain control over their energy and mineral resources 
and fish stocks, protect the maritime environment from pollution, and regulate marine 
scientific research. Conflicts and disputes began to rise in the international arena. 
Consequently, the United Nations initiated conferences to prevent the escalation of 
conflicts and disputes between maritime states. 
 
Figure 2.   Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace33 
 
Since 1956, the UN has held three conventions associated with the Law of the 
Sea. The first, “UNCLOS I,” was held in 1956; the second, “UNCLOS II,” was held in 
                                                 
33 The Commander's handbook on the law of naval operations, July2007, Reprint, Washington, 
D.C.: Dept. of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1–3. 
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1960; and the third, “UNCLOS III” began in 1973 and ended with the ratification of a 
treaty by each state in 1982. The UNCLOS III treaty came into force in 1994. 
Unfortunately, not all states signed the treaty. Some of the most significant achievements 
of UNCLOS III were: the number of participant states, which reached more than 150; 34 
the provision of the states’ legal extension of their territorial sea boundaries to 12 nautical 
miles; the provision of the states’ rights in maritime-related issues, such as innocent 
passage, transit passage, over flight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ),  continental shelves, and the establishment of a dispute settlement 
framework that could involve either the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
International Court of Justice, or arbitration. 
H. THE UNCLOS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
 The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman are the two states that 
border the Strait of Hormuz. Only 21 nautical miles separate the two countries at the 
narrowest point.35 Oman signed and ratified the treaty of UNCLOS III, whereas Iran 
signed but never ratified it.36 
Prior to the Iranian Act of April 12, 1959, the traditionally territorial sea 
boundaries of both Iran and Oman were at the three-mile limit, later extended to six 
miles.37 This limit kept the Strait of Hormuz open as a high seas corridor which allowed 
vessels, including foreign warships, to transit freely. Iran then passed the Act of 1959, 
which declared an expansion of its territorial limits to 12 nautical miles from shore, and 
the right for it to control innocent passage through the waters it had declared within its 
                                                 
34 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), December 10, 1982. Accessed 
November 9, 2011. 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm  
35 Commander R. H. Kennedy, “A Brief Geographical and Hydro Graphical Study of Straits 
Which Constitute Routes for International Traffic,” A/CONF.13/6 and Add.1, extract from Official 
Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, 1958,. Accessed July 18, 2011. 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/docs/english/vol_I/9_A-CONF-13–
6_PrepDocs_vol_I_e.pdf  
36 Groves, 18. 
37 Charles G. MacDonald, “Iran’s Strategic Interests and the Law of the Sea.” Middle East 
Journal, vol. 34, no. 3, Summer 1980,  305–306. 
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control. 38 Subsequently, Oman produced a royal decree in July 1972 to expand its 
territorial waters to reach 12 nautical miles from shore as well.39 Thus, the high seas 
corridor had totally vanished. 40 
 
Figure 3.   The Strait of Hormuz before and after UNCOLS41 
 The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest point, became an integral part of the 
territorial seas, according to these claims of Iran and Oman. These claims were based on 
their national interests; therefore, both governments insisted that foreign warships, 
submarines, and aircraft must obtain prior permission to exercise innocent passage 
through the strait. Iran and Oman regarded the strait as part of their territorial seas.42 On 
the other hand, the rest of Gulf States regarded the Strait of Hormuz as one of many 
                                                 
38 Ibid, 305–309. 
39 Ibid, 389–398. 
40 Groves, 19.  
41 Ibid, 19.  
42 Ibid, 19–20. 
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international straits used for international navigation. According to them, the right of 
transit passage and the freedom of navigation should be accepted as reflected in 
UNCLOS. 
In 2010, the defense ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of 
Oman held a meeting in which both agreed to provide mutual cooperation and 
coordination in the field of defense, security, and protection for the Strait of Hormuz. The 
meeting came after the attack by unknown parties on a Japanese supertanker crossing the 
strait.43 
I. CONCLUSION 
The Arabian Gulf region remains one of the most unstable regions in the world. 
The region became interdependent with the world economy to meet the vast global 
demands of energy and serve as a trade hub for international shipping. Oil and gas 
exported from the region must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which is the only sea 
entrance and exit to the Arabian Gulf.  
The Strait of Hormuz has become the focus of a dilemma between two parties that 
both claim their rights under UNCLOS. Iran, along with Oman, reserve the right—which 
is driven by self-interest—to expand their territorial seas 12 NM and control navigation 
through the strait. The rest of Gulf States seek a utilitarian approach that keeps the strait 




                                                 
43 “Iran and Oman to provide security for the Strait of Hormuz,” Gulf News, August 4, 2010, 
Accessed July 19, 2011.  http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/iran-and-oman-to-provide-security-for-the-
strait-of-homuz-1.663868  
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III. THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS IN CASE 
IRAN ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Strait of Hormuz is generally considered one of the most essential maritime 
chokepoints existing today in terms of the worldwide energy system.44  In 2009, 
approximately 15.5 mbpd of crude oil was shipped via the strait daily. This represent a 
fifth of daily oil consumption worldwide. Hormuz strait is 21 miles wide at its narrowest 
point, with shipping lanes that are split by a separation zone that is two mile wide.  
 Iran is situated strategically on the east and north of the strait. Two of its naval 
bases are situated at the approaches to the strait in the Bandar-e Abbas and Chah Bahar. 
Iran has frequently threatened to disrupt oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz and 
destabilize the Arabian Gulf region, especially in response to insecurity.45 The threat of 
closure of the strait is one of the major energy security concerns globally. Approximately 
90% of Arabian Gulf oil must pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Closure of the strait 
would eliminate approximately one-quarter of global oil from the market.  With regard to 
this issue, many questions have been raised about Iran’s capability to disrupt oil flow 
through the strait, and the potential impact to regional economies and the global energy 
system. Repeated reports of Iran’s intentions have been accompanied by predictions of 
the catastrophic impacts this action would have on oil prices and the global supply chain. 
Additionally, closure of the strait could result to harsh economic conditions for Iran. Yet, 
even in light of the implications, Iran continues to make threats to close the strait.  
This chapter attempts to clarify the likely regional and global implications in the 
event that Iran attempts to close the Arabian Gulf to maritime activity by blocking the 
Strait of Hormuz. This chapter considers the likelihood that Iran—in the name of its 
national security, nuclear ambitions, and protecting its self-interests—would close or 
                                                 
44 Eugene Gholz et al., “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the Persian 
Gulf,” 20 August 2008. The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, The University of 
Texas at Austin, 1. 
45 Rodney A Mills. “Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Saber Rattling or Global Energy Nightmare.” 
Naval War College. Newport, RI. Unpublished paper, 2008. 
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block maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz if threatened or pressured by 
superpower countries seeking suspension of Iran’s nuclear program.46 
B. IRAN POSES THREAT TO CLOSE THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
For thirty years or more, Iran has periodically threatened to close the Strait of 
Hormuz as a punishment to its enemies. Each threat to cut off the world's oil supply has 
probably contributed to the increase of oil prices to today’s record heights. The Iranians 
actually attempted to partially close the strait in 1987–88.47 However, the effects they 
had intended were not realized as the attacks did not cause a significant economic 
damage to the targeted Gulf States; they instead provoked an American response that was 
quite costly to Iran. 
Iranian officials have continuously engaged in an escalated war on words to 
threaten the Arabian Gulf and Hormuz.48 The Supreme Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei, cautioned the U.S. that it should not initiate an attack against Iran—and that if 
it attempted to do so, the United States’ shipping and its maritime assets in the Arabian 
Gulf “shall be the first targets of Iran.”49 The commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, 
Ali Mohammed Jafari, stated that in the case of attacks on Iran by the United States or 
Israel, it would close off the Strait of Hormuz and oil/gas facilities in the Arabian Gulf to 
wreak chaos in oil markets. This statement was followed by another, more confusing, 
threat from Iran’s oil minister and other officials, who seemed to reiterate the leader’s 
rhetoric that an attack on Iran would result in disruption of the world’s oil supply.50 
                                                 
46 Ibid, 2. 
47Paul Rivlin, World Oil and Energy Trends: Strategic Implications for Middle East, Jaffee Center 
for Strategic Issues, 2000, 16. 
48 Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner. Iran and the Gulf military balance-I: The 
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In reaction to this, the United States gave a warning that closure of the strait by 
Iran would be regarded as an act of war, and that the U.S. would not tolerate Iran holding 
hostage almost a third of the global oil supply.  
An article in the journal International Security51 asserted that Iran could impede 
shipping through the strait for a month, and any effort by United States to reopen the 
strait would possibly escalate the conflict. However, in a later issue, the journal published 
responses that questioned key assumptions of the article and suggested actions would 
result a shorter re-opening timeline. On February 8, 2010, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
declared that “on 11th February, which would be the 31st anniversary of the revolution of 
Iran, the nation of Iran would punch the superiority of the western countries in a way that 
they will be left stunned.”52  
Since that declaration, analysts have expressed the opinion that despite their 
threats, Iran could not close the strait. Instead, the most it can do is instill fear and 
uncertainty into the energy markets through its threats of interruption.53 However, the 
actual release of small quantities of explosive mines, for example, would produce 
significant results.  Such an act would disrupt energy markets and stimulate costly 
insurance premium increases within the marine industry. The main barrier for Iran would 
be shipping the mines through the waterway that is monitored very closely by the U.S. 
Navy.  
To carry out its threats, it is anticipated that the Iranian government would not 
only use conventional forces to threaten the Gulf region, but they would also exploit the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is a product of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini54, the spiritual and political leader of the revolution, established to 
protect the Islamic order of the new Iranian government after the Iranian Revolution in 
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International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer, 2008): 82–117. William,D O'Neil. and Talmadge Caitlin. "Costs 
and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz." International Security 33, no. 3 (2009):190–197. 
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1979.55 Iran could use this force to perform asymmetric wars, target maritime assets 
(such as warships, Very Large Crude/Gas Carrier (VLCC/VLGC) tankers, and ships), and 
attack offshore oil facilities. 
 
Figure 4.   The Structure of Iranian Joint Armed Forces General Staff56 
 If Iran were to succeed in the laying of mines in the strait, intended results would 
be achieved until commercial traffic could be assured of total clearance of the threat to 
shipping lanes. Despite the recent advances in technology, mine clearance is a process 
that is under-resourced and slow. Therefore, in the absence of a nuclear weapons 
capability, mines are considered the weapon of choice for Iran, and the one most likely to 
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succeed in its effort to disrupt oil delivery through the Strait of Hormuz.57 The Iranian 
military may also use torpedoes, missiles, and fast swarm boats to target the GCC’s 
offshore oil facilities, oil tankers, and even U.S. military bases in the Gulf. The threat 
would be sufficient to scare the global economy even as it is recovering from the current 
global economic crisis. This implication has resulted in some analysts describing the 
closure threat as “the real nuclear weapon for Iran.”58 Regardless of the weapon used, 
closure of the strait would likely result in significant impact to Iran in the form of military 
response from the U.S., Israel, or possibly its Gulf neighbors. 
C. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been working secretly and outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) to achieve full production of nuclear material for weaponization.59 After the fall of 
Saddam’s regime, Iran regarded the emergence of the United States in the region as a 
strategic problem—a problem which became one of Iran’s main incentives to pursue a 
nuclear weapons policy.60  According to the Iranian constitution of 1979, the foreign 
policy of Iran rejects all forms of foreign hegemony or domination. 61 Iran’s biggest 
foreign hegemony security challenge comes from Russia, Israel, Pakistan, India, and the 
U.S. military presence in the region.62 Therefore, Iran’s main motivations were national 
security to ensure self-protection, the necessity for achieving global prestige, asserting 
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domestic Iranian pride, and securing regional hegemony and dominance.63 The interest of 
Iran in a nuclear program is driven by nationalism and an associated internal symbolic 
perception of its position as a significant power in the region and the world.64 Unlike 
other nations, the presence of atomic power in Iran raises many concerns in the 
international community, due to the imminent and persistent threats issued by the 
government. In February 2010, Iran had successfully reached the 20% level of uranium 
enrichment needed to produce a weapon, despite its economic challenges and 
technological barriers.65 With the advent of the Arab uprising of 2011, “The Arab 
Spring,” analysts suggested that Muammar Gadhafi had made a big mistake when he 
surrendered Libya’s nuclear program in 2004. Iran might think that the international 
coalition would not have stepped in to support the Libyan opposition forces if Gadhafi 
had continued advancing toward a nuclear weapon.66 
Many individuals and groups agree that the presence of nuclear weapons in a 
politically unstable nation poses a significant risk. Nuclear power in the hands of radicals 
and an unstable regime would consequently have severe repercussions for its neighbors 
and the world as a whole. Consequently, Iran’s militant stance has caused many of its 
neighbors to purchase arms.67 This is an indication that if Iran becomes nuclear-armed, a 
nuclear arms race in the Middle East region could ensue. This would additionally disrupt 
the fragile stability of this vital region, which remains the major energy source, not just 
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for the United States, but also for the entire world.68 Similarly, the interruption in 
accessing energy supplies would jeopardize the sustainability of the world’s economies.  
The main threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran is the likelihood that it will bolster 
the nation’s current belligerent foreign policy. As a result, the international community 
can anticipate frequent confrontation and encouragement for extremists, since Iran is 
considered a global sponsor for state terrorism via its operational and financial support 
for radicals, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, al-Houthi in Yemen, Hamas in 
Palestine,69and more recently support for such groups in its neighboring countries Iraq 
and Afghanistan.70 Nuclear technology in Iran could potentially be shared with 
extremists that are hostile to Western nations, especially the United States.71 A nuclear 
weapons capability in the Islamic Republic of Iran would be a direct threat to the 
economies of the developed nations, especially the U.S. in the sense that the unmonitored 
nuclear weaponry could be transmitted in cargo containers at major ports in the United 
States.72 
D. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Closure of the strait would have very detrimental effects to Iran itself. Iran 
depends on imported petroleum, and its stagnating economy largely depends upon 
exports of oil and gas; thus closure of the strait would be a very risky strategy. It could 
even invite military revenge intervention from United States, Israel or a coalition force.73 
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This would certainly lead to loss of assets, military personnel, infrastructure as well as 
extensive destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities.  
 Although Iran would likely achieve military success and gain some political 
advantage for a period of time from a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, there are major 
disadvantages to Iran in undertaking this action. The biggest drawback would be the 
unfavorable economic impact to Iran. In 2007, Iran received as revenue of $80 billion 
which accounted for 60% of its budget.74 Since most of the revenue-producing 
infrastructure in Iran is physically located in the Gulf, closing the strait would cut off its 
primary income source as well. In addition, lack of adequate refining capacity forces Iran 
to import refined petroleum products. It therefore follows that closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz would result in a severe deterioration of Iran’s already threatened economy.75 
 It is unlikely that the United States and its western allies would allow Iranian 
vessels to leave the Arabian Gulf in the event of an act against unimpeded maritime 
transportation through the strait. The disruption of oil passage through the Strait of 
Hormuz would demonstrate Iranian power, deny access to important energy nodes in 
Arabian Gulf for the United States and other global economies, and cause the price of oil 
to significantly increase. In the course of doing so, Iran could draw global attention to its 
broader conflict with America and perhaps reinforce its bargaining power. Success in 
blocking the Strait of Hormuz may result in a tactical symbolic victory for the Iranians. 
Regional experts and analysts concur that closure of the Strait of Hormuz could 
be attempted as a final desperate option for Iran. Preventive strikes designed to effect 
regime change, or attempts to incapacitate vital national capabilities could provoke Iran 
to execute this strategy.76 However, if Iran attempts to block the strait, it must first 
consider the repercussions it would absorb as a result from opposing forces. Also, some 
87 % of Iranian imports, and around 99 % of its exports, are by sea; thus, closure of the 
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strait will possibly impact Iran more harshly than any other country.77 Nevertheless, the 
issue of Iranian threats to block the Strait of Hormuz has to be taken seriously, as it will 
likely remain a crucial dimension of its strategy for a long time. 
 It is likely that the world’s response to an attempted Iranian blockade would be 
rapid and severe, probably starting with U.N. sanctions, as well as other political 
pressures from regional nations. The policy of imposing sanctions would probably delay 
Iran’s progress to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and would keep Iran isolated 
from the international community. Sanctions would certainly damage the Iranian 
economy, especially since its government-subsidized petroleum price would have to 
substantially increase in order to compensate for lack of the imported product. With a 
restriction in the amount of government-subsidized petroleum that Iranian motorists can 
purchase monthly, there is a probability that large-scale and prolonged economic 
hardship would ultimately weaken the regime by further catalyzing anti-government 
protests.  
Greatly reduced revenue—in an economy dependent upon exports of oil and gas, 
and cutoff by sanctions—would restrict the ability of Iran to finance its proxies that 
operate in the region. Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Houthi would likely be impacted.78 If the 
U.S. and its allies agree to impose further unilateral embargos and sanctions on Iran’s 
energy sector and its central bank, then it is possible that the Iranian regime would have 
nothing to lose and react aggressively. Indications are evident that this may be their 
current strategy. In their most recent naval exercise, “Velayat 90,” Iran simulated tactics 
to close the strategic oil route and threaten shipping in the Arabian Sea and the Arabian 
Gulf as the United States began to withdraw its forces from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.79Moreover, the Iranian OPEC representative, Mohammad Ali Khatibi, 
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would hold the Gulf neighbors responsible for attempting to compensate for any shortfall 
in oil if the West imposes further sanctions against Iran’s oil export.80In response, the 
Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi assured that Saudi Arabia—producing over 10 mbpd and 
with the capacity to produce 12.5 mbpd—would compensate the shortfall of oil.81 
 China obtains half of its oil supplies from the Arabian Gulf. It is unlikely that they 
would be unresponsive to attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz. It is possible that China 
might join a coalition reaction, or apply its own diplomatic pressure. Iran would possibly 
be able to benefit from this threat only once. It is probable that reaction to a closure of the 
strait would result in military response, and a subsequent loss of all means to repeat the 
effort. Worse still for Iran, it is likely that the U.S. would quickly restore maritime 
shipping through the strait without escalating the crisis, and reduce the economic impact 
through the use of diplomacy. Ultimately, it is evident that Iranian attempts to block 
transportation through the strait would have minimal impact and result in loss of critical 
assets they can ill-afford to lose. 
 Over the long run, attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz would result to a 
considerable loss of national security to Iran. Therefore, if Iran is to expend scarce assets 
in a vain attempt to blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, it would leave itself very open to 
an escalation of sanctions or a consequent retaliatory attack. These issues should serve as 
persuasive considerations to dissuade Iran from attempting to close the Strait of 
Hormuz.82 
 The economic prosperity of GCC countries will depend on energy exports for at 
least another decade. The seriousness of the consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz 
varies from one GCC member to another. Disruption of oil passage through the strait 
would have considerable financial consequences for the Arab Gulf states—especially 
Kuwait and Qatar, whose borders are located entirely within the Arabian Gulf enclave, 
                                                 
80 Al Arabiya, Iran warns Gulf states not to compensate for oil shortfalls after Western sanctions, 
January 15, 2012.  http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/15/188401.html  




82 Ibid, 11. 
 31 
and presently do not have the energy pipeline infrastructure that can provide alternative 
oil delivery capability. In 2008, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE were the largest exporters of 
oil globally. Blockade of the energy supplies from these three GCC members would have 
significant impacts on the financial markets and the economic activities worldwide. 
According to Reyadh Alasfoor: 
the oil revenues allow the GCC states to: 1) Support large government 
bureaucracies that provide employment to citizens and monitor their 
political behavior. 2) Provide subsidies or free public services to citizens 
with no taxes. 3) Build capital-intensive militaries that link their security 
to the interests of important world powers. 4) Provide for the ruler’s most 
important constituency, their own families. Without oil revenues, this 
ruling bargain would collapse. One GCC official said: “The goal of 
improving the standard of living of our people is one of the GCC’s most 
important objectives.” And perhaps the most important test of regime 
competency in the new century will be their ability to continue to meet 
public expectations. In the GCC states, oil revenues subsidize most of the 
social and infrastructural services for which the citizens of other countries 
pay with own incomes (income taxation in the GCC states does not 
exist).83 
 Being an important oil producer, as well as the largest global exporter of liquid 
nitrogen gas, Qatar would be extremely affected by closure of the Strait of Hormuz. 
Though successfully expanding into areas like tourism, education, and financial services, 
the economy of Qatar is still based on hydrocarbons export, which supports the highest 
per capital GDP worldwide.84 For Qatar to maintain that high living standard, its 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil have to first pass through the Strait of Hormuz.85 
Qatar exports about two Billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of natural gas to the UAE and 
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Oman through long offshore and onshore pipelines under the Dolphin project. The 
closure of the strait would therefore deprive Qatar of more than 70% of its export 
income.86 
 In the event of a successful blockage of the strait, similar impacts await other oil-
based economies of the Gulf region, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Iraq, and Bahrain. If the pipeline of Habshan-Fujuirah were to be completed before a 
closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it would offer the UAE an economic lifeline that would 
bypass Hormuz and deliver 1.5 mbpd to the Gulf of Oman.87 Loss of oil revenue for Iraq 
would be a devastating blow to a regime that is still working on stabilizing the nation and 
establishing its authority.88  For the other hydrocarbon producers (non-Arabian Gulf), the 
increased prices that would result from closure of the strait would cause a considerable 
windfall that would aid in offsetting the world’s economy decline in those nations.  
 The least affected Gulf nation would be Oman, due to its geographic location 
outside the strait. Saudi Arabia is capable of temporarily bypassing the strait using land 
routes for oil transportation to its eastern ports; thus, it has the ability to control the 
higher prices of oil quite easily.89 UAE and Qatar, the Gulf’s main exporters of gas, 
deliver their exports through the strait in the form of liquefied natural gas. Presently, no 
pipelines are in existence in the Arabian Gulf that could be used as alternative 
transportation mechanisms to export the gas outside the GCC. Nations like Qatar and 
UAE could benefit from an acceleration of plans to develop an alternative overseas gas 
and oil delivery capability. 
 Imports would also be affected significantly as result of a blockage of the strait, 
increasing raw commodities and prices of consumer goods as well as increasing the 
financial costs to GCC domestic economies. The greatest challenge for the leadership of 
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the GCC will be at the political level: how will the leaders deal with militaristic 
confrontations with Iran while opposing its actions firmly? Gathering domestic opinion 
and consolidating that opinion collectivity through the GCC as a recognized diplomatic 
voice on the international level can help influence and resolve regional differences, and 
help avoid placing the regional nations in a treacherous position during a phase of 
volatility.90 
 While Iranian attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz seem implausible, and its 
ability to effectively implement it for any time period appears even less likely, the Iranian 
government appears to remain convinced that the suffering it could impose on its 
adversaries is a viable tool for use in maintaining internal stability and control. Until Iran 
obtains viable nuclear weapons capability, it appears that its best method of disruption of 
energy commodity transportation through the Strait of Hormuz would be through the 
laying of sea mines.91 A successful full-scale blockade designed to cause serious global 
economic consequences would be quite difficult to achieve.92 Despite the benefits that 
Iran might achieve, the consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz would backfire on 
Iran, hence making its action futile. 93 
E. GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Strait of Hormuz is described as the world’s most crucial chokepoint. As the 
only sea entry and exit point for the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is a very crucial 
node to the world’s energy trade.94 Approximately 15 mbpd of crude oil was delivered 
daily through the strait, forming around 20% of the global daily oil consumption. With 
around 40% of the crude oil that is traded daily being shipped through the strait, any 
closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran is top on the list of energy security threats 
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globally. Approximately 90 % of all Arabian Gulf oil departs the region on tankers which 
have to pass through this strait situated opposite the coast of Iran.95 Land pipelines do not 
currently offer adequate alternative routes of export. 
 The oil flowing through the strait accounts for around 40% of the crude oil that is 
traded worldwide daily. The Strait of Hormuz is vital to the regional producers, to 
Western energy consumers like the United States, Japan, Europe, and Australia, and to 
the entire world’s economy.96 With the strait closed for a long time period, the effect it 
would have on the global economy would be quite significant. Any disruptions of the oil 
supply from the Arabian Gulf by sea would threaten markets, increasing prices to very 
high levels. This would greatly shake the world’s economy. The effect would be even 
more acute in economies that are slowly recovering from the recent worldwide recession.  
Closure of the strait would remove almost a quarter of the world’s oil from the 
market. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the global demand for oil is 
projected to increase from 87 mbpd in 2010 to 99 mbpd by 2035.97 The U.S. imports 
around 22% of its oil from the Gulf. This comprises approximately 12% of America’s oil 
demand. Europe imports around 30% of its oil from the Gulf. The Asian market, which 
includes Japan, South Korea, India, and China, represent the chief destinations.98Asia’s 
oil imports from the Gulf accounts for around 75 % of its imports, and thus it would be 
greatly affected by closure of the strait. The region also supplies Australia with almost 
14% of its oil import needs.99 Recent statistics have suggested that roughly one-third of 
China’s oil imports are delivered through the Strait of Hormuz. Closure of the strait 
would therefore cause great damage to China’s expanding economy. 
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Country 
Total Reserve in 
Billion barrels 
as of 2010 
Thousand barrels  
per day  in 2010 
Percentage of 
top 17 oil net 
exporters Total Production Total Export 
*Saudi Arabia 262 10521 6526 19.3 
Russia 60 10124 5607 16.6 
Nigeria 37.2 2458 2256 6.7 
*UAE 97.8 2812 2108 6.3 
*Iran 137.6 4251 2087 6.2 
*Iraq 115 2408 1873 5.6 
Angola 9.5 1987 1766 5.2 
Norway 6.6 2133 1590 4.7 
Venezuela 99.3 2374 1532 4.5 
Mexico 10.4 2982 1446 4.3 
*Kuwait 104 2450 1429 4.2 
Libya 44.2 1789 1293 3.8 
Kazakhstan 30 1610 1232 3.6 
Azerbaijan 7 1040 777 2.3 
Algeria 12.2 2077 764 2.3 
*Qatar 25.4 1437 751 2.2 
*Oman 5.5 867 744 2.2 
Total 1063.7 53320 33781 100 
Table 1. Top world oil net exporters in 2010.100 (*Regional states in the Arabian 
Gulf) 
The United States is the world’s largest energy consumer. It is currently 
experiencing 10.8% unemployment, as well as record government deficits of around U.S. 
$1.5 trillion. Its long recovery process makes it particularly vulnerable to oil prices and 
supplies.101 The U.S. dollar has become the world's dominant reserve currency for trade 
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and oil pricing. “U.S. petrodollar warfare” is regarded as one of the most critical driving 
forces of United States foreign policy.102 Therefore, most countries are compelled to 
maintain huge stockpiles of dollars in order to continue imports. This is the most 
significant reason why it would never tolerate closure of the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. 
military forces would undoubtedly respond, after coordinating with regional powers, in 
response to an Iranian-imposed disruption. Consequently, the presence of the U.S. 
military in the Arabian Gulf has been vital in preventing any destabilization of the 
region.103 
Australia is one of the chief importers of energy. Around one-sixth of Australia’s 
total imports of crude oil was from the Middle East in 2007 to 2008, of which most was 
shipped through the Strait of Hormuz from the UAE.104 Although Australia would 
probably be less affected by closure of the Strait of Hormuz in a direct sense compared to 
other countries, nonetheless it would suffer economic impacts. The main consequence of 
the closure would be a significant reduction in the quantity of oil available for 
importation from the Arabian Gulf into Australia. The likely global economic contraction 
and the corresponding elevation of oil prices would have a similar negative impact in the 
Australian economy, as well as its trading partners. Australia may join any multinational 
force in an attempt to reopen the strait.  
History provides examples of past oil market reactions and shipping industry 
behavior in situations where passage through the Strait of Hormuz was threatened by 
Iran. During the war between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988, shipping through the 
Strait of Hormuz from the Arabian Gulf was attacked by each side.105 The shipping 
industry’s behavior during that time period can be considered an indicator of the 
anticipated response to an Iranian blockade.  War, political embargoes, revolution, and 
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natural disasters all provide examples of the anticipated reaction of oil markets as a result 
of disruption of the supply. 
There is evidence from recent history and market data that links disruptions in 
transportation with a reduction in oil exports due to a variety of causes. Sharp increases in 
oil prices followed, regardless of the cause of the disruption. In several examples from 
the 1970s and 1980s, excess capacity from other nations was normally available to reduce 
some of the disruptive effects. The growth of global oil demand in the last few decades 
has eliminated a great deal of the surplus capacity from the worldwide system. Much of 
the surplus capacity which remains is presently controlled by the Arabian Gulf nations, 
which are reliant upon the Strait of Hormuz to deliver it.106  
In order to counteract the impacts of oil supply interruptions, the United States 
and several other nations have built strategic petroleum reserves that are designed to 
supplement imported oil for a period of months. The International Energy Agency noted 
that the net importing members, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), typically need to have adequate reserves of crude oil, as well as 
the refined products, to manage a supply disruption for approximately 90 days.107 
In 2007, a study of the economic implications of closing the strait concluded that 
use of strategic petroleum reserves would alleviate the market effects of oil supply 
disruption.108 The study also showed that much of the adverse economic impacts from an 
energy crisis could be blamed on inadequate government policies. Examination of past 
fluctuations of oil prices suggests that markets are resilient, regularly accommodating 
significant alterations in oil prices. Considering all this, a disruption of oil supply through 
the Strait of Hormuz could cause significant market fluctuations in the short term, though 
the problem would be controllable and economies would compensate over the long run. 
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The Strait of Hormuz is viewed widely as one of the most significant maritime 
transportation chokepoints that exist today. It is certainly the most essential with regard to 
the global energy system. A fifth of the oil consumed by the world flows through the 
strait daily. Iran has frequently threatened to disrupt oil flow through the Strait of 
Hormuz, especially in reaction to perceived attacks and internal issues. An actual attempt 
to block transportation through the strait would potentially result in significant 
consequences for short-term oil prices as well as the global supply chain. However, 
according to analysts, Iran's capability to close the strait should not be regarded as a 
foregone conclusion, particularly when considering the extensive presence of the U.S. 
military in the region. In addition to the global concern over Iran’s nuclear program, an 
attempted closure of the strait would result in severe consequences for the Iranian 
economy. 
 Iranian attempts to successfully close the Strait of Hormuz seem improbable. Its 
ability to actually achieve it for any sustained time period appears even less likely. The 
Iranian government believes it could impose great suffering on its adversaries if it 
chooses to do so. Currently, its most likely method of disruption would be through the 
use of all available naval and air assets, especially submarines and helicopters, to lay 
mines in the waterway.109 A full-scale blockade—which if successful would evoke 
serious global economic consequences—would be, at best, quite difficult to achieve. Iran 
might achieve some degree of success in an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, but the 
consequences would have a detrimental effect on Iran itself, hence making its action 
futile.  
                                                 
109 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities (London: Sampson Low, 
Marsten, May 2005), 62–63. 
 39 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE GCC 
STATES SINCE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an attempt to illustrate the role of the GCC in the region, this chapter includes 
analysis of the historic relationship and the contemporary internal conditions that exist 
between Iran and the GCC. It will also analyze the importance of the relationship between 
the GCC and other regional stakeholders, such as the presence of U.S. military forces in 
the region. The chapter will also discuss the ambitions of the Iranian government, 
particularly Iran’s attempt for regional hegemony in the Arabian Gulf region by 
examining its effort to build nuclear and military capabilities. 
The security and stability of the Arabian Gulf region is of particular importance to 
the international community, especially as this relates to assurance that a reliable supply 
of oil and gas can be shipped from the region to the international market.110 Since Iran 
has been labeled the main security threat to the GCC states, especially due to its intention 
to become the regional hegemony supported by the notion of exporting its Islamic 
revolution,111 ,112 exploring the dynamics of Iran’s relations with the GCC states should 
be the first step towards establishing an effective security framework for the Persian Gulf. 
The period following the Iranian Islamic revolution has been characterized by major 
conflicts and transformations that have influenced the relationship between Iran and the 
GCC states. The GCC states sought to distance themselves from Iran during the Iran-Iraq 
war.113 The southern Gulf States’ support for the U.S. presence in the Gulf during Iraq’s 
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invasion of Kuwait—and the subsequent reliance on the U.S. to guarantee security to the 
GCC states—had significant implications for Iran’s policy towards the GCC states.114  
In addition, the disruption of the balance of power between Iran and Iraq by the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq created an opportunity for Iran to adopt policies that would 
assert its hegemony across the Arabian Gulf. The failure of the United States to 
reconstruct a new balance of power meant that the U.S. would have to be actively 
involved in restricting Iran’s influence on the GCC states. This has significantly affected 
Iran-GCC relations, especially due to the reluctance of the GCC states to abandon their 
close ties with the United States. In this paper, I discuss these and other issues affecting 
the relationship between Iran and the GCC states since the Iranian revolution. First, I 
discuss the evolution of Iran’s policy towards the GCC states followed by an exploration 
of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the GCC and the evolution of Iran-
GCC relations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. This will be followed by a discussion on 
how U.S. involvement with issues in the Gulf has impacted Iran-GCC relations; and 
finally, on the buildup of military capabilities between the GCC and Iran. 
B. IRANIAN STRATEGY IN THE GULF 
In its continuous attempts to obtain regional hegemony, Iran seeks to establish 
and build military and nuclear capabilities based on oil revenue. Iran’s ambition to spread 
its Islamic revolution to all Gulf States is the main factor that has influenced its foreign 
policy towards the GCC states.115 Indeed, the GCC emerged as a mechanism for 
opposing Iranian influence on the Arabian Gulf states. Iran’s government is widely 
viewed in terms of their perceived ambition in the Gulf region. It took part in both the 
support of proxies in the region and the acquisition of nuclear energy for domestic 
purposes and enhanced military capabilities. Besides their attempt to spread the Islamic 
Shi’a doctrine in the region, Iran has sought—and is still seeking—to become the 
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dominant Arabian Gulf regional military power. In simple terms, Iran’s government has a 
hegemonic interest of acquiring power to assert economic, military, religious 
(ideological), and political dominance in the region. The ambition behind the motive is to 
ensure that they protect the regime, defend the integrity of their territory, influence the 
regional process including those in the GCC States, and spread their version of Islamic 
revolution.116 
Iran’s government has exhibited interest in regional control, and frequently 
appears in the international limelight backed by its relatively large geographical territory 
and domestic population. Iran also believes that its military enjoys the support of the 
greater Islamic world. In these ways, Iran has campaigned to increase its ties and 
influence with both the regional and international communities.  
The end of the Iran-Iraq war was viewed as a global development that would 
enhance collective security in the region. The collapse of the USSR, the fall of Saddam's 
regime in Iraq, and the U.S. war on terrorism have been viewed as areas that Iran has been 
exploiting in order to elevate its own stature in the global sphere. It is therefore important 
for the GCC to consider: what exactly is the ambition of the Iranian government in both the 
local and international sphere? Iran has apparently strived to get its regime recognition 
within the world community. The country has opposed several attempts by the U.S., the 
European Union (EU), and the Soviet Union to reinstate peace in the region, instead 
terming it as undermining the stability of the Islamic regime. Its political ambition has 
been to seek public acknowledgment of the regime's immunity to the political, economic, 
and military power of the U.S..117 
The other area that Iranian government emphasizes, in terms of its ambition, has 
been ensuring that it protects the integrity of its sovereign territory. In order to realize this 
goal, the Iranian government has reinforced its military forces to contain perceived foreign 
threats as well as protect its territorial integrity. Iran developed relations with countries 
such as: Russia, China, and North Korea to acquire weapons and military equipments for 
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improving its conventional forces capabilities.118 The intention of the Iranian regime is to 
increase its regional influence, expand its power projection capabilities to restrain U.S. 
military options, and exhibit intimidation abilities to its neighbors.119 
The war that the Iranian government entered into with Iraq (1980–88) served as a 
reality check of its military vulnerabilities. Iran demonstrated irregular and asymmetric 
warfare capabilities such as threatening the oil tankers “Tanker War,” supporting proxies 
and Shi’a community in many Gulf countries, and exercising blocks and threats against 
the Arabian Gulf. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and various missile 
systems that were used against them in the conflict showcased how their military base 
was insufficient to protect their territorial integrity. Iran’s ambition is, therefore, to ensure 
that its regime is not toppled by the U.S. government’s military like the regimes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Iran enjoys massive resources that are essential to sustain its domestic economy. 
The natural resources mainly come from oil and gas. However, utilization of these 
resources depends on the relations that exist between Iran and other countries such as 
Russia, China, and the states of Central Asia. Iran’s government is committed to 
controlling the production and transportation of its energy resources. However, they 
maintain that they will obtain the necessary funding and technology for exploitation and 
preservation of their resources from sources in foreign communities. The fact is that the oil 
and gas revenue inspired the Iranian government to expand its political influence in the 
region. This push is evident in the Middle East and central Asia. In order to achieve this 
objective, the Iranian government has sought to develop political tools that can be used to 
extend its political influence on the region's unstable countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Lebanon. The Iranian government has also participated in conducting global foreign 
policy that is designed to amass networks or alliances in an effort to position itself for a 
key leadership role that would be recognized in the international community. This 
movement is considered internally as an expansion of the Islamic revolution which it 
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believes will protect the Muslim world against the existing international systems. For 
example, the Iranian government has staged its struggle against Israel as one of their key 
operational components to foster support for expanding their political influence in the 
region against an unjust international system.120 
Iran has also been ambitious about developing a resistance network. The 
resistance network “Hezbollah” has been built to oppose the existence of Israel. This 
resistance network has been supported by the Iranian government both financially and 
politically. States and organizations within Iran’s network have also been indoctrinated to 
work against the interests of American and cooperating Western forces. The network is 
encouraged to undermine traditionally moderate regimes that existed in countries such as 
Lebanon. The intent of the resistance network has been to serve the interests of the Iranian 
government, and spread the Islamic regime throughout the global region. By taking steps 
to build its regional and global political alliances, Iran has stretched its Islamic network 
across Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen, through the Shi’a communities in these 
states. 
A major ambition of the Iranian government has been to develop its nuclear 
capabilities. Iran believes that its national security policy should include the establishment 
of not only its national security, but also the configuration a broader security concept in 
the region. It has embarked on production of nuclear and military capabilities to enable 
the regime to put in effect its version of general security issues, and influence economic 
security in both the regional and international sphere. Efforts to build nuclear plants 
required the Iranian government to establish external alliances and agreements. This is 
especially evident in their growth of diplomatic ties with Russia, China, and North Korea, 
which has enabled the regime to counter the sanctions imposed by the UN and U.S. 
government. Reflection on the significance of the issues presented in this section suggests 
that the government of Iran is increasingly ambitious, and without containment by regional 
and international stakeholders, some of these ambitions may result in implications that 
will be difficult to control in the future. 
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The relationship between Iran and the GCC States was unstable for many 
decades. In 1971, Iran occupied UAE three islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and 
Lesser Tunb—and since then have refused to resolve the case in the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ).121  The strategic locations of the three islands—right in front of the strait 
and near the shipping lanes—could be used not only to target maritime traffic and assets 
in the Arabian Gulf, but also as an additional line of defense for Iran as an advance 
maritime base with full facilities, operating defensive measures, and radars on the 
islands.122 Iran targeted the oil industry of Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq War.123 Iran 
disputed the ownership of Qatar’s North gas field with Qatar.124 The tension between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia—the two regional rivals and the two biggest producers of oil in 
OPEC—has continued along strategic, political, and ideological lines.125 Iran has 
continuously challenged the Saudi government regarding Islam, and has further 
encouraged demonstrations and disturbances in the holy place of Mecca126 by 
politicizing Iranian pilgrims during Pilgrimage (Hajj).127 In order to expand the 
revolution, the Iranian regime has been attempting to support Shi’a communities in the 
GCC States. Using the political and economic relative deprivation method, Iran 
encouraged those communities to rebel against the GCC’s Sunni governments.128 The 
GCC states viewed the Iranian attempt as a step to undermine the growing security 
cooperation that exists in the Gulf region. The counter effects of this attempt resulted in 
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GCC states tightening security in the region through bilateral agreements with U.S and its 
allies. The GCC states have a collective view that security in the region must remain 
vigilant to the political ambitions of an omnipotent Iranian hegemony. 
 The leader of Islamic revolution, Khomeini, had desired that all Gulf States adopt 
Iran’s system of government and cut their diplomatic ties with any external powers.129 
Khomeini’s goal was to make Iran the main security provider in the Gulf region by 
reducing Western influence on the Gulf States. During the initial stage of the Iranian 
revolution, the relations between the GCC states and Iran suffered significantly. For 
instance, the Gulf States demonstrated their disfavor with Iran by providing financial and 
logistical support to Iraq during its war with Iran.130 In addition, the GCC states alleged 
that Iran was continuously supporting a plot to overthrow Bahrain’s government, as well 
as supporting the Shiite community in carrying out various anti-government activities in 
Kuwait. Further, Iranian pilgrims threatened to wreck havoc on the 1987 pilgrimage to 
Mecca. These incidents, coupled with Iran’s dispute with United Arab Emirates over the 
islands between the two states, made Iran-GCC relations more difficult.  
The leadership of Iran has a high tolerance for risks, and for this reason, it has 
been described as being messianic.131 Iran is displeased with the status quo in the entire 
Middle East region and is ready to use any means available to achieve its goals. First, 
Iran considers itself the leader of the Islamic world.132 Indeed, since the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, Iran has been campaigning for the spread of Islamic justice throughout the 
Gulf region and the entire Islamic world.133 Iran regards itself as the catalyst of Islamic 
revival and the vision bearer for all Muslims in the Middle East. Second, as such, it 
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assumes that most Arabic and Muslim states in the region would support its ideology and 
vision. Iran is determined to spread its hegemony throughout the Arabian Gulf region. In 
order to assert regional influence, Iran has attempted to spread the view that its interests 
echo the interests of the entire Muslim world. For instance, in response to Arab and 
Muslim skepticism about Iran’s nuclear plans, Khomeini emphasized that the success of 
Iran’s nuclear power project would bring honor to the entire Muslim world. Khomeini’s 
intention was not only to justify the nuclear program but also to warn the Arab states 
against supporting the United States in case it plans to invade Iran.134 With regard to 
Palestinian issue, the Iranian president Ahmadinejad gave a statement about wiping Israel 
off the map which was intended to gain wide support from many Muslim nations. Third, 
Iran intends to remove the influence of the United States from the Arabian Gulf in order 
to pave the way for the achievement of its ambition of becoming the regional power. In 
addition, Iran considers Israel as a security threat to the Muslim world because of its 
support for the United States. Therefore, eliminating Israel is part of Iran’s long-term 
security goals.135 Finally, Iran intends to enhance its regional influence by enhancing its 
control of the energy market.136  
 Iran has attempted to establish close economic relations with the GCC states. 
Prior to Khatami’s election to the presidency, Iran relied on GCC states such as Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for banking services and trade. Iran has particularly 
been quite active in Dubai with intentions of using the opportunity to gain access to 
various goods including oil service equipment.137 This demonstrates Iran’s departure 
from foreign policies based on purely religious interests in favor of more pragmatic 
strategies based on economic interests. The UAE is regarded among the largest trade 
partners of Iran. Both states maintain close economic ties based on long-standing and 
historic relations that have allowed many Iranians traders to migrate and invest in UAE’s 
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strong and stable market. There are more than 450,000 Iranian residents in the UAE.138 
Although the dispute has not been resolved over Iran’s occupation of the three UAE 
islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa), the UAE has managed to separate 
its economic imperatives from its political one in regard to this issue. The UAE has 
sought to resolve the dispute using international law and the International Court of 
Justice. 139 This is part of Iran’s bigger picture of establishing dominion over the Caspian 
and Gulf region through economic ties which will contribute to its military build-up to 
become a regional superpower. Initially, Iran’s ideological strategy of Islamic revolution 
failed, thus necessitating adoption of more pragmatic policies. However, Iran’s long-term 
goal is to see the GCC states break free from dependence on the United States for 
protection.140 In so doing, Iran will have succeeded in marginalizing if not destroying the 
GCC organization. Thus, Iran has prioritized establishment of bilateral relations with 
individual GCC states rather than deal with the GCC as a whole. Iran has taken advantage 
of the fact that the GCC has failed to devise an effective strategy to address the Iranian 
problem. 
 Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power and the response of the international community 
best depict its confrontational relationship with Western powers.141 Beginning in the 
mid-1980s, the United States has dismissed Iran’s claims that its nuclear energy program 
is for peaceful use. The reason for this confrontation lies in the disparity of views about 
the nuclear programs between the two sides. To start with, the United States, representing 
the West, views nuclear power in relation to security issues. In support of this view, the 
reasons for Iran’s engagement in nuclear power program include Israel’s venture into 
nuclear energy for deterrent purposes, Iraq’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1980s, 
and the possibility of a U.S.-led attack on Iran. Based on this view, it is assumed that if 
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Iran breaks loose, it would quickly develop nuclear bombs and disrupt world security. On 
the contrary, Iran’s view of its nuclear program is based on domestic political issues and 
the dividedness of the West in handling Iranian issues. Iran views acceptance of the 
Western demands on nuclear energy as part of the West’s meddling in other affairs such 
as the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and human right issues. Iran’s leader, 
Ahmadinejad, has articulated this view several times by referring to the Western 
perception of Iran’s nuclear program as “nuclear apartheid.”142 
However, the GCC states are united towards opposing Iran’s military ambitions, 
including upgrading of its naval facilities and pursuit of nuclear power. To start with, the 
GCC states are aware of their direct vulnerability to Iran’s superiority and are afraid of 
the motives behind Iran’s ascendancy. The wariness of the GCC states is not only due to 
the nature of the Iranian regime, but also because Iran is a permanent Gulf power—unlike 
the United States.143 In addition, the possibility of naval confrontation involving Iran and 
the United States, especially in Bahrain where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is positioned, is a 
major security concern for the GCC states.144  
C. GCC ESTABLISHMENT AND CURRENT ISSUES 
 It is important to understand that the concept of Khaleejism—“Al-Khaljanah” in 
Arabic—as a significant factor in the GCC’s historical response to events in the Gulf 
region. It represents a form of nationalism and identity that is uniquely related to the Arab 
states of the Arabian Gulf, a legacy characteristic of the Arabian Peninsula’s desert-
dwelling social environment. Khaleejism is commonly and occasionally used to describe 
the idea that people represented by the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) collectively 
share norms and values that transcend geographic boundaries and create a unique GCC 
identity. The notion of Khaleejism is characterized by an integration, partnership, and 
confederation under one regional entity that share many things in common. The Arab 
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Gulf States share many political, economic, and social similarities: political monarchy 
systems, strong economies, interests and aspirations, the Arabic language, paternalism, 
historical background, the Islamic religion, homogenous cultures, customs, traditions, 
tribal structures, and a shared geographic location—the Arabian Peninsula—all of these 
are Khaleejism-influencing factors which contributed to the establishment of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).  
The formation of the GCC and its charter was based upon a regional legal, 
economic, and political mandate. The strategy for merging the common interests of the 
six traditionally tribal Arab Gulf States—the Kingdom of Bahrain, Kuwait, the Sultanate 
of Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (or 
“UAE”)—was centered on the establishment of strong relations to address security 
concerns and issues that impact the political economy of the region. The strategy that 
evolved with the formation of the GCC is viewed as a survival strategy intended to 
collectively manage the inherent volatility of the region; particularly that originating 
from two neighboring states: Iran and Iraq.145 Understanding the circumstances in which 
the GCC was formed, and its significant role in the region in terms of collective security, 
provides valuable insight for external decision makers impacted by regional disruptions 
of the global energy supply chain.  
The establishment of the GCC organization is attributed to the Iranian revolution, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the war between Iran and Iraq. These events 
prompted the need to form a strong regional relationship to ensure collective security. On 
May 25, 1981, the rulers of the six Gulf States held their first meeting in Abu Dhabi, 
UAE. The formation of the Council was intended to: (1) accomplish collective cooperation 
in all aspects as a means to unity; (2) create similar institutions including economies, 
customs, commerce, health, legislation, administration, communication, social welfare, 
education, culture, information, and tourism; and (3) catalyze technological and scientific 
progress.146. The cooperation between the six Arab countries has proven to be productive 
in terms of its political and economic outcomes. The cooperation had substantial 
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considerations for the need for sensitivity with regard to the political and economic 
dynamics that exist in the region. The success of the GCC states has been realized 
through a steady and thoughtful consensus approach designed to achieve collective 
cooperation through the integration of the Gulf member states’ individual priorities.  
The policies of six individual GCC member states have been effectively 
coordinated to deal with common problems and challenges that are faced collectively 
within the region. Before its organization, problems of the Gulf States were viewed as 
competing and contradictory. For example, divisive factors such as the existence of an 
economically affluent Saudi Arabia dominating pricing arrangements over the common 
market products of oil and petrochemicals,147 was a significant barrier to cooperation that 
the GCC helped resolve. Prior to the GCC’s organization, these competing individual 
priorities among member states in the region had diminished the effectiveness of the 
accord. In order to remove the barriers, the GCC took the responsibility to strengthen the 
ties between its members. It also went a further step to fulfill and meet the aspirations and 
ambitions of the citizens in the GCC.148 By enabling efforts to coordinate policies, the 
member states were able to enhance trade and address common security issues within the 
region. The policies that led to the formation of the GCC emerged from different 
organizations that had previously existed in the region, such as the Arab league in 1945, 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation OIC in 1969, and the successful federal union 
between the seven Trucial emirates to establish the United Arab Emirates UAE in 1971.  
The charter of the GCC has a well-established structure. Agenda items are 
introduced and considered by three main bodies: the supreme council, the ministerial 
council, and the secretarial general. The ultimate goal of establishing these structures was 
to address the political and strategic issues that were of central concern within the Gulf 
region. Priorities have included Arab relations, international relations, security issues, and 
information sharing.149 Common goals integrated into a defined structure have enhanced 
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the establishment and implementation of the GCC policies—particularly those that have 
facilitated mutual security through the purchase of weapons for mutual defense—not only 
to reduce the degree of dependency on foreign bilateral defense agreements, but also to 
contain the Iran-Iraq war and Iran’s provocative actions and interferences towards the GCC 
states. 
 
Figure 5.   The GCC Organizational Structure 
The formation of the GCC can be viewed as a result of two main areas of 
cooperation: economic and security cooperation. The main economic objective of the 
GCC was to coordinate and integrate the economic policies of the Gulf States into a 
common market. The efforts of the economic cooperation in the region were intended to 
improve the efficiency of the economy and create a greater wealth distribution in the 
region. The economic unity agreement that was signed by the member states in 1981 was 
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placed above the previous bilateral agreements, and established a process to facilitate the 
freedom of movement between the Gulf States, enhance completion through freedom of 
trade, and establish a common economic infrastructure for the region. The economic 
policies were also intended to eliminate the existing custom duties in the region, 
coordinate import and export policies, free movement of labor, enhance technological 
development, and promoting common policies for oil and joint projects in the region.150 
On the security front, the GCC’s establishment was based on principles to guide 
the security policies of the region. In this respect, the GCC’s main mandate has been the 
promotion of the well-being of individuals through the promotion of stability and security 
in the region. The formation of the GCC is founded on the principle of collective 
security. It was also established to act as a mutual-defense mechanism against forces that 
impact the domestic stability and foreign relations of member states.  
The defense policies of the GCC States are concerned with weapon acquisition 
and the formation of military Gulf forces called the “Peninsula Shield Force.”151 It is 
important to note that the collective security mission of the GCC states is focused on the 
integration of joint defense systems and the development of a common military 
infrastructure. These policies were also intended to address the purchase of arms while 
establishing a joint military system capable of responding to security issues in the region. 
For example, the Peninsula Shield Force, as a joint security arrangement, has conducted 
military exercises in the region. GCC security personnel have worked out a contingency 
plan to address security threats that are likely to confront the region.152 
The GCC states have been wary about the security of the entire Gulf region since 
the eruption of Iranian revolution. The revolution gave rise to many shared security 
concerns among the GCC states. As early as 1981, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait 
were particularly concerned about a possible disruption of their internal affairs—
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especially following a botched coup plot in Bahrain. The coup was linked to pro-Iranian 
activism in the region and went a long way into justifying the establishment of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.153 The security threat posed by Iran in the region led the GCC 
states to launch a campaign to establish a working security framework to guard 
themselves against Iran’s subversive tactics. Territorial conflicts and border disputes are 
some of the issues that have characterized relations between Iran and GCC states, 
especially during the last three decades. Boundary conflicts pose a serious threat to 
security in the gulf, especially due to the large amounts of wealth in the form of oil that 
could change hands if a boundary is moved only a few degrees. Although border disputes 
may exist between the GCC states, those that involve non-GCC states such as Yemen, 
Iran, and Iraq have been of particular concern. Iran has been a major player in the 
competition for the GCC states since the British withdrawal from the region. Iran’s 
occupation of three islands believed to be part of the United Arab Emirates continues to 
raise political tensions and stand in the way of cooperation between Iran and the GCC 
states.154   
 Recent conflicts in the Gulf region have disrupted the balance of power and 
transformed the relationship between Iran and the Gulf States. During the early 1980s, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq were the main regional powers, each of which had the ability 
to establish a new regional order. Indeed, the last decade of the 20th century was 
characterized by a decline in the significance of the Arab-Israel conflict as a regional 
destabilizing factor. At the same time, the confrontation between Iran and the GCC states 
gained more weight as a regional security threat. Although Iran and Iraq had a greater 
potential than any other did Gulf State to disrupt regional order in the 1980s, Iraq’s 
military prowess helped to keep the Iranian revolution at bay since the two powers were 
always antagonistic. However, after the Iran-Iraq war, and the elimination of Iraq from 
the power play by the United States, Iran began to direct its antagonism towards the GCC 
states.155 In response, the GCC states have been working towards a cooperative defense. 
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The fact that GCC leaders did not clearly identify military cooperation as one of its main 
agenda items reveals that their attempt to come up with a cooperative military strategy 
barely a year after the GCC was formed was born out of fear of external attack, especially 
by Iran. Although initially the main focus of the joint military campaign was to confront 
the threat of posed by Yemen to Oman, the Iranian attack on Saudi and Kuwait oil 
tankers in 1984 prompted the GCC leaders to speed up the process of establishing an 
integrated defense force.156  
At the same time, Saudi Arabia began strengthening its air force while assisting 
Kuwait to upgrade its missile system. Apparently, the GCC leaders advised Saudi Arabia 
to take more stringent security measures to guard oil tankers during the 1984 GCC 
summit. This is because after the meeting, the Saudi Arabia air force kept a full-time 
patrol over the Gulf’s western shores to prevent Iranians from attacking oil tankers. The 
attempts to strengthen domestic and regional defenses intensified throughout the 1990s 
with more of the GCC states’ income being allocated for the purchase of sophisticated 
weapon technology. Saudi Arabia is believed to have taken the lead in buying the best 
weapons and building defense strategies, including the Delmon Eye project intended to 
link the Air defense of Saudi Arabia with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman as part of the GCC 
defense program.157 The GCC leaders chose Oman to head the process of developing an 
integrated GCC defense force at the 1990 GCC summit. Since Oman had been a victim of 
external aggression, perhaps the GCC leaders felt that Oman best understood the urgency 
and necessity of a joint military force. Further, the invasion of Kuwait revealed the 
solidarity of GCC states under the threat of external attack by Iran. Despite their military 
inferiority at the time, the GCC states supported the UN coalition force by providing 
military bases, fuel, and troops. Up to now, Iran has been denied the opportunity to 
become a member of the GCC. The exclusion of Iran from GCC membership sheds more 
light on its relations with the GCC states. To start with, the GCC states share the view 
that Iran and Iraq were the main destabilizing agents in the Gulf at the time of the GCC’s 
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formation.158 In addition, the GCC states viewed the Iranian revolution as a major threat 
to regional security due to its potential to establish a new Islamic regional order.159   
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND GCC STATES (1979–2011)  
The Iranian Islamic revolution and its impact on Iranian foreign policy laid the 
foundation for the formation of the GCC. The GCC states were uncomfortable with the 
Iranian revolutionary ideology and did not wish to participate in Iran’s war with Iraq.160 
The Iranian leader made it clear to the GCC states that they should depend on Iran for 
security instead of relying on Western powers. He also wished that GCC states would 
embrace Iran’s new political ideology and system of government. However, the GCC 
states considered the Iranian revolution a threat to their internal security, and hence 
joined hands under the GCC umbrella to find a means of protecting themselves. Both the 
United States and the United Kingdom were pleased with the idea of forming a protective 
mechanism that would delineate Iran and tame its desires.161 The GCC states’ disfavor 
with Iran became clear during the Iran-Iraq war in which the GCC states supported Iraq. 
The GCC states were particularly put on high alert following allegations that Iran 
supported the 1982 coup to overthrow the Bahrain government, Iran’s role in the 
bombing of numerous Western embassies in Kuwait, and Iran’s territorial disputes with 
the United Arab Emirates.        
 Iran’s relations with the GCC states during the reign of Rafsanjani were driven by 
both short-term and long-term ends. Iran’s immediate goals were to reverse the negative 
impact of Khomeini’s revolution on its relations with GCC states and keep Iraq under 
check. To reconcile with the Gulf States, Rafsanjani focused on improving ties with 
Saudi Arabia. The 1987 bloody had severely damaged Iran’s diplomatic relations with 
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Saudi Arabia. However, the two states renewed their ties in 1991 due to their common 
opposition towards Iraq. The evidence for the restoration of diplomatic ties between the 
two countries includes Saudi Arabia’s expression of support for the Rafsanjani regime, 
which culminated in the 1998 state visit of the Iranian leader to Saudi Arabia.162 
Rafsanjani’s strategy for the GCC states was not only bilateral but also included an 
attempt to collaborate with the GCC in addressing regional security issues. However, the 
GCC’s 12th summit held in Kuwait only supported bilateral ties with Iran in pursuant of 
shared interests and dismissed Iran’s offer to become the region’s security guarantor. 
Instead, the Gulf States preferred the presence of Western powers for fear that Iran had 
malicious intentions. At the same time, the United States was strongly opposed to Iran’s 
inclusion in regional security arrangements. In addition, Iran was still occupying the 
disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Tunb. Indeed, the territorial disagreements between 
Iran and the United Arab Emirates prompted the United States to intensify its military 
presence in the GCC states, hence giving it an upper hand in influencing GCC states to 
adopt anti-Iranian policies.     
In 1997, Iran hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which 
marked a major shift in Iran’s diplomatic relations with other Arab states.163 The meeting 
signaled Iran’s willingness to pursue friendship with other Arab states. The Iranian 
leader, Khatami, recognized that closer ties with his neighbors would not only be 
beneficial economically but also improve security in the region. Khatami also recognized 
the strategic role of Saudi Arabia in the Arabian Gulf and continued to strengthen its ties 
with GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE. However, Iran’s tolerance and 
willingness to pursue diplomatic ties with the Gulf states was driven by national interests 
rather that a change in ideology. Iran still held onto its radical Shi’a religious ideology, 
which differs significantly from the Arabic interpretation of Islam. In addition, the 
conflict over the three islands between Iran and United Arab Emirates continued to 
undermine progress towards closer diplomatic ties between Iran and the GCC states.    
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Iran's Import from GCC states (in Millions of dollars) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Bahrain 65 52 55 42 50 101 112 147 100 724 
Kuwait 10 11 25 80 64 107 175 229 155 856 
Oman 4 2 4 6 3 22 51 509 346 947 
Qatar 5 20 23 66 27 31 58 76 52 358 
KSA 163 261 405 249 254 444 469 615 418 3278 
UAE 1502 1848 3135 5476 7285 8980 10081 13199 8973 60479 
Total 1749 2194 3647 5919 7683 9685 10946 14775 10044 66642 
Iran's Exports to GCC states (in millions of dollars) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 130 123 137 157 209 250 295 386 262 1949 
Oman 46 22 46 41 53 112 157 208 141 826 
Qatar 25 19 18 14 52 53 63 82 56 382 
KSA 119 90 115 274 487 583 688 901 612 3869 
UAE 348 365 381 438 582 697 822 1076 731 5440 
Total 668 619 697 924 1383 1695 2025 2653 1802 12466 




 The most recent factor affecting the relationship between Iran and the GCC states 
is the 2003 Iraq war and its aftermath.  The GCC states distanced themselves from the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq despite their awareness of the implications of the war for their own 
security.165 Apparently, the GCC states could not interfere with U.S. invasion of Iraq 
since the U.S. is their security guarantor. Their dependency on the United States for 
security is one of the factors believed to be fueling rivalries and tensions in the gulf.166 
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The GCC knew that the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime would open up the region to 
Iran’s expansionism. For this reason, the GCC states expressed dissatisfaction with the 
U.S. plans to withdraw its troops from Iraq before the end of 2011. Iran, on the other 
hand, desired the overthrow of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime. However, Iranians were 
concerned about the increasing influence of the United States in the region. This may 
explain why Iran opposed the Iraq war.167  
In 2005, Ahmadinejad, a neo-conservative, became the president of Iran, and was 
re-elected in 2009. This provides evidence that the neo-conservatives in Iran are stronger 
than the reformists.
168
 According to analysts, he squandered all of the good reputation 
restored by Rafsanjani and Khatami with the West and the GCC States.169 In addition to 
Iranian support for the Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ahmadinejad attempted 
to cultivate stronger brotherhood ties and went beyond the region by seeking new allies 
with many states in Latin America. He has adopted a foreign policy whose main focus is 
to secure Iran's interests in the region and enhance Iran’s national security.
170  
Ahmedinejad aimed at addressing Iran's security challenges while utilizing the 
opportunity created by the absence of Afghanistan's Taliban and Iraq's Ba'athist regimes. 
This pragmatism will continue to shape the behavior of Iran's government under 
Ahmadinejad. However, Iran's foreign policies have primarily been guided by ideology 
and geopolitics, both of which have different implications for the region and the West. 
The main sources of disagreements between Iran and the United States are the Iranian 
nuclear power issue, the sanctions imposed on Iran, and the presence of U.S. forces in the 
region. Since Iran's security or insecurity have significant correlations with regional 
security or insecurity, the United States and the GCC states have a reason to intensify the 
pursuit of consensus on the nuclear dispute. Therefore, it is necessary for the U.S. and 
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Iran to initiate dialogue to resolve all concerned issues through direct or indirect 
channels. Although Ahmedinejad's government has received widespread support 
domestically for regarding Iran's nuclear program as a technological advancement for 
which the nation and even the region needs to be proud,171 the Gulf States have 
experienced a sense of intimidation and crisis behind the Iranian regime’s motivation in 
developing its nuclear program.  
Although Ahmedinejad invited and attended the 2007 GCC summit in Doha to 
propose a security and peace agreement with the GCC without any foreign intervention, 
the GCC leaders had suspicions about acceptance of the Iranian regime. The U.S accused 
Iran in destabilizing the region especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, 
GCC States asked the Iranian regime to stop using non-state actors for interfering in 
GCC’s internal affairs. 
E. U.S. STRATEGY IN THE GULF AND ITS IMPACT ON IRAN-GCC 
RELATIONS  
The United States is currently the main external security guarantor in the Gulf 
region. Therefore, as opposed to Iran, the United States supports the status quo and is 
unlikely to tolerate much risk. This is because the current security arrangement is of vital 
benefit to the international community since it ensures safe access to energy resources, 
especially oil from the Arabian Gulf region. Although the United States is unlikely to use 
military means against Iran, it is determined to defend its allies in the region—including 
the GCC states—against Iran’s aggression. The U.S. security strategy for the Gulf region 
is thus based on several related goals: deterrence of attack on its territory by its enemies, 
especially Iran; defending its GCC allies from their aggressive neighbors; and ensuring 
stability in the Gulf region to guarantee access to the region’s energy resources.172 In 
addition, the U.S. presence in the region limits the relative political advantage that its 
adversaries would gain over U.S. allies in the region.  
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The United States considers the “balance of power” approach as the most 
appropriate strategy for guaranteeing security in the Gulf region.173 Before the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, the balance of power between Iraq and Iran was the main source of 
political stability in the Arabian Gulf.174 The balance of power created an opportunity for 
the United States and other external powers to pursue their interests in the region. 
However, the regime change in Iraq following the U.S.-led war in 2003 disrupted the 
balance of power by eliminating Iran’s main rival, hence creating an opportunity for 
Iran’s influence to increase. The United States failed to redefine the role of Iraq in the 
balance of power in the Arabian Gulf following the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime. 
Apparently, the United States has attempted to establish a new balance of power by 
minimizing Iran’s influence. However, the role of the United States as an actor in the 
balance of power in the Arabian Gulf has created more security concerns. Following the 
2003 Iraq war, the United States and Iran have been competing for influence in the Gulf 
region.175 The two states hold conflicting views about how to provide security in the gulf. 
While the U.S. security strategies are centered on the view that Iran is the main source of 
insecurity in the region, Iran regards the involvement of the United States in the gulf as a 
security threat by itself.176 The United States has pursued deterrence and containment 
policies to maintain the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf in the past. During the 
1990s, the United States practiced a dual-containment strategy aimed at limiting the 
power capabilities of Iraq and Iran.177 The implementation of dual containment involved 
the use of sanctions, military presence, minimization of the influence of other foreign 
actors such as Russia, as well as conducting weapon inspections in Iraq and Iran. 
However, the dual-containment strategy no longer functions effectively due to the lack of 
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a suitable state to play the role of Iraq. Indeed, the balance of power approach has led to 
an escalation of the competition between Iran and other Gulf States for military 
dominance. 
 The willingness of GCC states to allow the United States military to remain in the 
region is one of the main factors hindering smooth relations between Iran and other 
Arabian Gulf States.178 Indeed the GCC states have a relatively long history of 
dependence on Western powers for protection against potential aggressors, especially 
Iran. Since the early 19th century, the smaller GCC states relied on Britain for protection. 
However, Britain’s withdrawal in 1971 opened up the region for U.S. influence as a 
security provider, with Saudi Arabia taking an early lead in establishing close ties with 
the U.S.. Other GCC states followed in Saudi Arabia’s footsteps and established bilateral 
security and military arrangements with the United States. Iran has all along maintained 
the view that the U.S. military presence in the Gulf is a threat to security and has been 
urging GCC states to cut their ties with external powers and cooperate with Iran in 
establishing a security system that is void of Western influence. Apparently, the GCC 
states do not trust Iran’s intentions and have always feared Iranian hegemony, hence they 
would prefer to heighten their perceived vulnerability compared to Iran by seeking help 
from the United States rather than attempt to cooperate with Iran.  
 In addition, Iran is particularly not pleased with the GCC states for supporting 
U.S. views concerning its nuclear technology issue. The Obama government is 
determined to deter Iran from developing nuclear capabilities for fear that Iran might 
develop nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the GCC states have better chances than Iran 
to succeed in launching their own nuclear energy programs due to their close ties with the 
United States. For instance, the United Arab Emirates has already entered into an 
agreement with the United States to begin a nuclear energy program under strict 
instructions to prevent leakage of technology to Iran.179 This demonstrates the double-
standards of the U.S. nuclear energy policy and increases Iran’s disappointment in the 
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GCC’s support for U.S. policies. The GCC support for U.S. policies towards Iran 
continues to cause concern in the region, especially in the event that Iran threatens to 
retaliate. 
F. MILITARY BUILUP AND ARMS RACE BETWEEN IRAN AND GCC 
STATES  
Recent trends indicate that both Iran and the GCC states have embarked on 
improving their military capabilities. Part of Iran’s military modernization strategy is to 
develop its domestic defense industry and produce its own advanced weapons.180 In the 
past, Iran has demonstrated its ability and desire to acquire weapons technology from 
Russia, China, and North Korea. Indeed, Iran has been equipping itself for asymmetric 
warfare through procuring air and anti-ship missiles, submarines, advanced air defense 
missiles, and other weapons. It has also bought modern tanks and aircraft from Russia. 
Furthermore, Iran has made significant progress in deploying long-range missiles 
including shahab-3 missiles and advanced scud-type weapons. Iran’s other major goal is 
to improve its asymmetric warfare capabilities both at sea and on land.  
 Similarly, the GCC states have each taken measures to improve their individual 
military capabilities, perhaps to increase their ability to resist possible Iran aggression. 
However, the GCC states lack a collective defense strategy, which is a major weakness 
since none of the GCC states is individually capable of deterring Iran using military 
means.181 The United Arab Emirates has enhanced its naval capabilities by establishing 
naval bases and acquiring a fleet of fast naval vessels to protect its maritime and coastal 
resources from any form of attack.182 Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is intending to 
develop blue water capabilities and has already acquired surface assets with a wide range 
of capabilities. Saudi Arabia has also taken measures to develop its domestic defenses, 
including the upgrading of the Saudi Arabia National Guard and air forces. Other GCC 
states such as Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain are expanding their air and naval capabilities. 
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Development of surface-to-air missiles of varying ranges appears to be a shared focus 
among the GCC states. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are 
procuring modern Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) systems. The United Arab 
Emirates finalized the agreement with U.S. to acquire Terminal High-Altitude Air 
Defense (THAAD) units.183 
The revamping of the military capabilities of GCC states indicates that they intend 
to be self-reliant in deterring Iran from using its military strength to take over regional 
control. However, since the GCC states have not yet developed a comprehensive joint 
security strategy, they continue to rely on the United States to protect them from external 
aggression. Apparently, the level of cooperation with the United States varies across the 
GCC states with the smaller, weaker states demonstrating more willingness to cooperate. 
Saudi Arabia, being the strongest GCC state, has demonstrated the desire to be self-
sufficient in its security provision. However, it cooperates with the United States in the 
meantime since it lacks the military capability needed to provide security in the Southern 
Gulf. Although Iran is quite stronger than any of the individual GCC states in military 
capabilities, its military power is much weaker than that of the GCC states combined in 
terms of the amounts of money spent on arms purchases and military developments.184 
However, due to lack of cooperation among the GCC states on security matters, they 
remain remarkably vulnerable to the threat of Iran. Despite the ability of the United 
States to gain quick control over any possible Iranian attack, there is no guarantee that it 
would do so, especially due to its lack of decisive power to strike Iranian forces.185  
G. CONCLUSION  
 Iranian foreign policy, the close ties between GCC states and the United States, 
and the balance of power phenomenon are some of the main factors influencing the 
relationship between Iran and the GCC states. Iran’s foreign policy has evolved gradually 
under different leaders since the Khomeini-led Iranian revolution. Initially, Iran adopted 
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an ideological approach to establishing itself as a regional superpower. However, this 
approach failed since GCC leaders considered Iran’s revolutionary ideology as a threat to 
regional security. In response, Iran kept its religious ideology in the background and 
adopted pragmatic approaches such as improving economic and diplomatic relations with 
GCC states. Although this approach led to an improvement in GCC-Iran relations, the 
achievement has been limited to bilateral arrangements to pursue state interests rather 
than attainment of Iran’s primary ambition of becoming a regional superpower. The GCC 
states’ close ties with and reliance on the United States as an external security provider 
has further complicated Iran-GCC relations. Since Iran opposes the United States in all 
ways, there can never be hope for tension-free relations between Iran and the GCC states. 
Indeed, both Iran and the GCC states have demonstrated varying degrees of insecurity. 
The failure of the GCC to develop an effective regional security strategy has forced 
individual GCC states to arm themselves in readiness for possible Iranian aggression. 
Similarly, Iran has been arming itself, partly to defend its borders in case of possible U.S. 
aggression over its alleged nuclear program, and partly in preparation to become a 
regional superpower. In summary, although there have been elements of positive 
relations between Iran and its GCC neighbors, their impact on the perception of Iran as a 
threat to regional security is insignificant since they are restricted to bilateral agreements 










V. CONCLUSION: THE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND 
APPROACHES OF GCC STATES TO BECOME THE REGIONAL 
SECURITY ENTITY 
A. THE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND APPROACHES 
The Gulf region supplies nearly twenty percent of global oil, making the region 
strategically important to the international community.186 Most of this oil is exported via 
the highly insecure Strait of Hormuz, from which it enters the Indian Ocean sea routes to 
the consuming states. This means that developing a security framework to ensure stability 
in the Gulf to prevent interruptions in the oil supply is a matter of necessity. The 
historical and current security state of the Gulf region further lays bare the need for an 
effective collective security apparatus. Inter-state wars, tensions, and political disputes 
have characterized the Gulf over the last three decades. The main destabilizing agent in 
the region has been the Islamic Republic of Iran.187 Iraq’s desire to prove its superiority 
as a regional power led to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, prompting the United States and 
other Western powers to intervene through military action and the imposition of 
economic sanctions on Iraq. The Islamic opposition intensified with the arrival of 
Western military forces in the region as demonstrated by the significant increase in 
terrorist activities that provoked the U.S. to declare war on terrorism and invade Iraq in 
2003. In addition, the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for dominion over the 
relatively smaller and younger oil-producing Gulf States continues to raise tensions in the 
region.188  
The regional security situation compelled the Gulf States to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to the problem, leading to the formation of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).189 Initially, the security strategies of the GCC states 
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included the use of diplomacy and military defense to prevent escalation of conflict. 
However, since the states are relatively small and weak, they settled for soft power or 
peaceful means of preventing conflict such as diplomacy, mediation, and conflict-
regulation tactics. However, these GCC strategies failed to deter Iraq from attacking 
Kuwait, hence demonstrating that peaceful tactics such as mediation would be inadequate 
to guarantee the security and political stability that the region required.190 This has 
remained a major concern for the GCC since subsequent arrangements to form a joint 
military force have been unsuccessful due to disagreements on the effectiveness of such a 
force.  
More recently, the GCC settled for a Joint Defense Agreement under which an 
attack against any of its member states would be considered an aggression against the 
GCC as a whole.191 The agreement requires each member state to provide military aid in 
case of such aggression. However, even after a decade of its existence, the joint defense 
agreement has been limited to minimal consultation and cooperation. Since the GCC is 
the only active regional entity in the Gulf, it should demonstrate more commitment 
towards provision of security in the region. This could be achieved through various 
strategies including construction of safe alternative export routes and seaports, working 
towards self-reliance in security provision, and establishing internal and external defense 
forces, among other strategies. In this paper, I explore the potential strategies that the 
GCC can adopt to become an effective regional security entity. 
B. STRATEGY I: CONSTRUCTION OF SAFE ALTERNATIVE PIPELINES 
AND SEAPORTS 
The GCC cannot hope to provide adequate security in the Gulf region without 
ensuring that its links to trade partners within and without the region are protected from 
any form of compromise. Currently, the Gulf States rely on the Strait of Hormuz to 
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transport over 85 percent of its oil to the USA, Europe, and Asia.192 Reliance on the 
Strait of Hormuz represents one of the biggest vulnerabilities of the Gulf States since a 
military confrontation involving Iran would lead to closure of the strait. Indeed, the 
likelihood that Hormuz would be closed amidst escalation of the dispute between 
America and Iran over Iran’s nuclear weapon program is very high. Although the idea of 
exploring alternative routes for transporting the Gulf oil might be in the minds of the 
GCC, there has not been any significant progress or commitment towards the endeavor. 
Yemen seaports are one of the most promising safe outlets through which the GCC states 
could channel their oil to the international community.193 Some of the Gulf States are 
speculated to be planning to construct pipeline networks to link them with Yemen and 
enable them to export oil without relying on Hormuz. One of the pipelines, the Gulf 
Pipeline, will run from Kuwait through the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to the 
Hadramaut port or the Mukalla port in Yemen. The other pipeline is intended to link the 
Al-Jubail in the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil reservoir in the world, to 
Yemen’s sea port of Hadramaut or Mukalla.194  
In addition to these two pipelines, the Gulf States could explore the option of 
channeling its oil through Saudi Arabia’s existing 5 mbpd capacity East-West oil 
pipelines or the United Arab Emirates’ 1.5 mbpd capacity oil pipeline to the coastal port 
of Fujairah.195 Currently, construction of a pipeline to transport Abu Dhabi’s oil directly 
to the Indian Ocean is ongoing—and if all goes according to plan—the pipeline will be in 
operation before the end of 2012. This provides another opportunity for the GCC states to 
minimize reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Although the pipeline is intended to serve the 
State of United Arab Emirates, it can be expanded under GCC agreement to enable the 
other GCC states to export their oil more cheaply and safely. Minimizing the use of the 
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strait of Hormuz would improve regional security, not only by reducing the economic 
costs of closing the passage, but also by increasing the ability of the U.S. to contain Iran 
without affecting the neighboring countries.  
   
Figure 6.   Trans-Arabian Peninsula Oil Pipelines.196 
The success of this pipeline project depends not only on the viability of the idea, 
but also on the shared interests of the Gulf States and Yemen. The Gulf States will be 
guaranteed a safe route for exporting its oil and elimination of the security risks 
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associated with reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. On the other hand, Yemen would be 
more than willing to benefit from the huge profits that such an arrangement could bring 
into the country. In addition, the initiative will promote the development of cooperation 
mechanisms and boost diplomatic relations between Yemen and the Gulf States based on 
common interests. Indeed, this would be one of the most promising strategies to persuade 
the GCC for making Yemen an integral part of the bloc and mend past conflicts and 
Yemen’s negative state image—further strengthening the GCC. Already, some of the 
major disputes between Yemen and some of the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and 
Oman, have been settled effectively. This serves to strengthen the optimism of the Gulf 
States that the pipeline project would be successful.197  
Moreover, the construction of an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz would do 
more than promote the interests of Gulf States; the international community including 
America, Europe, and Asia would benefit too. First, these states would not need to worry 
about being cut-off from their oil supply in the event that Iran closes the Strait of 
Hormuz. Second, the cost of importing oil from the Gulf States would decrease, since the 
distance between Yemen and the importing countries is much shorter than the distance 
between the Gulf of Arabia and the importing states.198 As a result, the project is likely to 
attract support and funding from members of the international community and further 
strengthen U.S. relations with the Gulf States. This is important because the Gulf States 
will remain dependent on international assistance in case of a major security threat.   
The large volume of sea trade contributes to the development and diversification 
of GCC income sources. To support this large volume, the GCC states have established 
modern seaports with various kinds of terminals to accommodate a wide diversity of 
vessels and ships for transferring passengers, oil, gas, petrochemical products, logistics, 
freights, and commodities. The GCC states have developed more than 35 seaports along 
the coastlines of the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red 
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Sea.199 Currently, most of these ports are witnessing huge expansions to absorb the 
increasing demand. In case Iran attempts to close Hormuz in the Arabian Gulf, these 
other ports in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea would be capable of 
providing sea-route alternatives to facilitate the movement of trade and navigation. In 
order to promote port-port or port-market operations, the GCC has linked all of its 
seaports and domestic markets to a modern transportation network of roads and railways.  
GCC 
Ports 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Share 
UAE 9,001 10,273 11,488 13,185 14,743 14,173 14,623 58.9% 
KSA 3,185 3,733 3,864 4,209 4,653 4,430 5,313 21.4% 
Oman 2,516 2,749 2,620 2,877 3,428 3,768 3,589 14.4% 
Kuwait 578 673 750 877 1,028 926 935 3.8% 
Bahrain 193 196 215 239 263 280 380 1.5% 
Total 15,473 17,624 18,937 21,387 24,115 23,577 24,840 100% 





C. STRATEGY II: PURSUE ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION POLICY 
The Gulf States feel that their economic viability for the long run, and thus the 
security of GCC governments, will be mainly determined by their actual progress to 
reduce heavy reliance on oil revenues.201 In turn, this will depend on the collective 
effectiveness of the governments to remove the obstacles that hinder the establishment of 
a customs union which lays the foundation of efficient industrialization and establishes 
economic diversification among the GCC States.202 
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The economies of the GCC States should continue to pursue an impressive 
economic transformation through a set of governmental policies for the development of 
economic diversification. The Governments in the GCC must establish and strengthen 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) to build up foreign assets which produced further fiscal 
surplus. The surplus would be used to reduce the debt of each government, which 
subsequently would positively contribute to the growth of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). The GCC should not only seek to spend the revenue on funding large-scale 
projects, but also must encourage the participation of private sector and Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) in capital and infrastructure projects. The GCC States should also 
expand the non-oil sector, and reduce reliance on oil and gas, to avoid being caught in the 
“Dutch Disease.” In addition to improving the investment climate and removing trade 
barriers, the GCC governments should establish regulations to administer the free trade 
zones, to allow full foreign ownership, to support manufacturing, and to improve the 
banking sector. 
D. STRATEGY III: PURSUE SELF-RELIANCE IN REGIONAL SECURITY 
PROVISION 
The slow progress of GCC towards achieving self-reliance in providing regional 
security implies that Gulf States will continue to depend on external help for security 
until they gain full control of the region. Currently, the GCC does not qualify to be a 
regional multilateral organization, and hence, cannot guarantee regional security on its 
own for several reasons. First, its rigid structure built around monarchism, and other 
similarities in its foreign policies, limits its capability for expansion.203 The Gulf States 
have similar international relations, especially with the United Statutes, common 
enemies, and similar perceptions of pertinent issues such as Islamic extremism and 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These commonalities limit the GCC’s capacity to 
accommodate Iraq and Iran. Leaving these countries out equates to the creation of 
“otherness” within the region, hence fueling conflicts instead of extinguishing them.204  
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Second, the Gulf States have been reluctant to integrate their capabilities despite 
having so much in common.205 On the contrary, they have embarked on improving 
individual defenses, not only to deter their external enemies such as Iran, but also each 
other. Finally, to achieve a strong multilateral cooperation, individual states must be 
willing to sacrifice some degree of individual state sovereignty in favor of policy 
alternatives that will yield common good. Unfortunately, the Gulf States are relatively 
new, hence they prioritize state-identity building which demands limited sharing of 
information, defense capabilities, and finance. This explains why GCC states have, in the 
past, failed to put up a strong military defense to deter insecurity in the region. In the 
meantime, the dependence of individual Gulf States on external powers, especially the 
United States, will continue to guarantee significant gains for the GCC states at the 
regional level. These include economic gains from trade and financial aid, and defense 
against hostile and seemingly stronger neighbors such as Iran. Such defense is also 
crucial for smaller states within the GCC that feel intimidated by larger states such as 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, owing to insufficient industrial and technological capabilities 
required to provide security in the region, the GCC cannot possibly imagine maintaining 
a stable balance of power and deterring conflicts without assistance from outside 
powers.206   
The great powers have an effective role for balancing the power in a regional 
system due to their superior and potential capabilities, as well as the reliance of the local 
actor on stronger and capable allies.207 The United States has a particularly great role to 
play in determining the future of the GCC as a regional security network. Over the last 
two decades, U.S. interests in the areas of Gulf oil, Israeli protection, and provision of 
support to favorable regimes have shaped development in the Gulf region.208 However, 
there are several reasons why the GCC should not continue to rely on external powers for 
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security. First, the strong presence of external security providers contributes to internal 
instabilities, since they demonstrate that local governments are unable to manage their 
own defenses. Therefore, local populations feel they are the victims of what may be 
called neo-imperialism.209 Second, the continued access to external sources of security 
may obscure the need for state governments in the Gulf to establish common defense 
mechanisms—multilateral arrangements for weapons control and training. This state of 
events may promote indefinite reliance on the less effective bilateral arrangements to 
provide security. Third, presence of outside powers will hinder general cooperation and 
collective efforts among the Gulf States. This is because such support may cause 
individual states to prioritize achievement of state foreign goals by taking advantage of 
their relative endowment rather than compromising such advantages for the common 
good.  
Fourth, the continued participation of external powers in the Gulf may lead to the 
establishment of a new regional order based on foreign ideologies and policies as each 
power attempts to establish dominion over its competitors in the region. For instance, due 
to the Gulf’s endowment with oil and other resources, China, the United States, and 
Russia have been competing to gain a foothold in the region.210 In addition, the external 
powers may take advantage of the region’s need for security to shape state practices in a 
bid to secure their political and economic objectives. Their influence could distract 
regional cooperation, and hence, hinder the GCC’s ability to become a successful security 
entity. Finally, the approaches used by external powers to provide security in the region 
may offset the balance of power, thus complicating the security dilemma. Deterrence 
practices such as the purchase of weapons or the forming of alliances may be interpreted 
as offensive by the opponent, hence increasing tension between opposing powers. For 
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transfers may be viewed as a threat to Iran, and hence provoke Iran to adopt defense 
mechanisms that are more aggressive, such as purchase of long-range missiles and 
nuclear capabilities.211  
 According to Stephen Walt, “If the United States is not going to try and control 
the Persian Gulf itself and is not going to withdraw and leave it alone entirely, then the 
only alternative is to try and encourage a (new) balance of power there. This is not a 
perfect policy, perhaps, just the best alternative.”212 Although the U.S. presence in the 
Gulf has maintained stability in the region, the public support for its strong presence has 
declined tremendously, dismissing it as imperialism. Such criticism only indicates that 
the Gulf needs to pursue self-reliance in providing security to its members. If self-
reliance means independence from America, then the GCC will need to come up with a 
strategy to contain Iran. Currently, the U.S. keeps Iran under check through unilateral 
means. Clearly, the GCC does not have the power to impose sanctions on Iran. However, 
it can pursue policies that would welcome Iran to become a state party rather than create 
tension by labeling it as an enemy.213 However, Iran’s ambitious plans to export its 
revolution and exert influence on all the Gulf States, coupled with its military nuclear 
power program, are sufficient reasons to prove that the country would not be willing to 
cooperate with the GCC in the near future and demonstrate the need for tougher security 
strategies.  
Owing to the fragility of interstate relations among GCC members, indigenous 
efforts alone cannot guarantee achievement of an effective security framework. 
Therefore, the GCC should welcome the participation of external powers in the process 
of establishing a lasting balance of power that is based on mutual coexistence for the 
common good. However, external contribution towards cooperative security must be 
multi-faceted. So far, military empowerment practices such as weapon provision and 
enhancement of deployment capabilities have dominated outside contributions to the 
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balance of power in the Gulf. Military balance alone is insufficient if the GCC is to 
achieve cooperative security. Instead, outside powers such as the United States should 
provide political and diplomatic assurance to state governments that a cooperative-based 
security mechanism is the best long-term solution to the Gulf security dilemma. In the 
meantime, the use of military capabilities should be regulated to allow progress towards 
achievement of cooperative security. 
E. STRATEGY IV: ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
SECURITY FORCES FOR THE GCC 
Maintaining calm within member states and protecting the Gulf region from 
external threats should be one of the priorities of the GCC as it moves towards self-
reliance as a regional security provider. Currently, the GCC must confront Iran’s attempt 
to cause disruption in the region by establishing a foothold in each of the GCC’s member 
states as well as its neighbors.214 Iran seeks to undermine U.S. influence in the area by 
exerting economic, political, and military influence on as many states as it can in the 
Middle East. The main goal of Iran appears to be to become the most powerful and 
influential state in the region. Some of the means Iran is using to gain such dominance 
includes missile and nuclear armament, deterring U.S. military action, and mobilizing 
extremists that are likely to cause conflicts and instability.  
There are several reasons to believe that the GCC should establish a strong law 
enforcement strategy to maintain law and order in the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
along with the rest of GCC members, are locked up in a tight competition for regional 
dominion.215 Although the two blocs maintain friendly relations superficially, Iran is 
determined to take advantage of Iraq’s predicament to regain political and military 
influence. In response, the GCC considers mitigating Iran’s influence as one of its main 
political agendas. Despite frequent public comments that improved Iran-GCC ties would 
provide solutions to many of the problems facing Middle East countries, there are many 
political, ideological, religious, and military issues that threaten to tear the two entities 
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apart. The absence of Iraq means that Iran has a greater capability to pursue ambitious 
expansionist plans. Iran’s military expansion plans present a significant threat to GCC 
States, especially due to Iran’s capabilities and its continuous attempts to disrupt trade.   
Religious differences are one of the main causes of tension between Iran and the 
GCC in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Since its establishment, Saudi Arabia has 
taken up the role of defending the political and spiritual interests of Sunni Muslims.216 
On the other hand, Iran is committed to spreading its Shiite revolution to all Islamic 
countries based on its belief that it is the legitimate leader and defender of the Islamic 
faith. These religious ideologies not only cause religious tensions, but also political 
conflicts in the whole Middle East region. Both countries appear to compete for the 
support of the other Gulf States. Saudi Arabia is particularly interested in becoming the 
leader of Southern Gulf region. However, the other GCC states have frowned upon Saudi 
Arabia’s initiatives due to failure to agree on military, finance, and other pertinent issues. 
Iran, on the other hand, has adopted different policies towards each of the gulf countries 
to gain competitive advantage over Saudi Arabia. However, it is difficult to determine the 
effectiveness of Iran’s strategies. What is clear is that the GCC states have a divided and 
fluctuating support for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
The need for the GCC to establish a regional defense force is now more obvious 
than ever as the competition between Iran and the U.S. for Saudi Arabia builds up. Saudi 
Arabia is perhaps the most influential of the GCC states due to its long history of 
cooperation with the United States.217 Saudi Arabia, along with other members of GCC, 
and the United States have a shared interest in taming Iran, providing security in the gulf 
region, and maintaining reliable flow of oil from the region. In addition, Saudi Arabia is 
committed to combating terrorism, dealing with conflict in the horn of Africa, and 
streamlining relationships with Yemen. These goals cannot be achieved without a strong 
military force. Further, Iran, being the main potential threat to security in the region, has 
a record of using violence to gain dominion if conditions allow. For instance, the 1980s 
Iran-Iraq war resulted from competition for dominion between Khomeini and Saddam 
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Hussein. Now that Iraq is no longer a major player in the power game in the region, Iran 
is determined to take over as soon as the United States loosens its grip. Since Saudi 
Arabia is Iran’s immediate enemy if foreign actors are excluded, the GCC has a reason to 
be concerned.  
 As a response to the growing Iranian threat, especially after Iraq has ceased to be 
a dominant regional actor, the United States has focused on improving military 
cooperation among GCC members. The Gulf States should cooperate with the United 
States to develop a strong military force that can deter a possible Iranian attack. The 
urgency and the need for such a force cannot be questioned considering that Iran has been 
pursuing nuclear capabilities that it could use when the need arises.218 So far, the Gulf 
region has been deliberating on how to best secure the region through counterterrorism, 
military cooperation, and maritime protection. Apart from establishing a joint military 
force to combat external threats, the GCC should also ensure each member state has a 
strong internal security force to combat acts of terrorism from extremists. In particular, 
most of the GCC member states are familiar with Shiite uprisings.219 These groups clash 
with other Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Bahrain due to differences in 
religious schools of thought. The groups are also thought to be incited by state actors, 
especially Iran, to wreak havoc within state borders. Therefore, combating such internal 
threats should be up towards the top of the GCC’s agenda.  Therefore, it is necessary for 
the GCC to enhance its internal security forces for: protecting national infrastructures; 
maintaining discipline, law, and order; and ensuring the enforcement of basic human 
rights, equality, and justice. 
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F. STRATEGY V: STRENGTHENING MARITIME CAPABILITIES FOR 
THE PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE 
According to Mahan’s doctrine—in order to preserve the maritime state’s 
interest—sea power emerges to maintain naval supremacy, Control vital maritime areas, 
protect sea lines of communications, and deny the enemy’s gain of sea commerce.220 
Securing the seaports, sea routes, and coastal areas in the Gulf region should be 
part of the GCC’s approach to providing regional security. Failure to do so would mean 
that rogue states could target these areas and compromise the main route for transporting 
goods to and from the region. A comprehensive regional maritime security would include 
all member states of the GCC, and other actors in the region, especially: Iraq, Iran (if they 
agreed to participate),  and Yemen, as well as other relevant states outside the region 
such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Singapore.221 However, it is 
impossible to launch a maritime security strategy with all these players at once. Instead, 
the project should start small, involving only GCC states, and then be extended to include 
the wider Gulf members and finally the international community. Maritime security is a 
complex issue due to the many stakeholders involved, such as transportation department, 
offshore oil operations, coastguard, customs, marine police, and navy. Although navies 
are involved in maritime security provision, the responsibility of formulating maritime 
policies should be delegated to coast guards from all of the participating states. Coast 
guards would thus be the primary maritime security providers whose responsibilities 
would include information gathering and sharing among themselves and other relevant 
maritime institutions. The navy would be the strategic and operational maritime security 
provider. In addition, they would liaise with air force units, providing surveillance 
beyond the shoreline, and address environmental, humanitarian, and economic issues 
relevant to maintaining regional maritime security.222  
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Currently, various Gulf States in the GCC have taken individual initiatives to 
secure their sea routes. For instance, the United Arab Emirates is developing naval bases 
and naval fleets with high-speed capabilities to enable it to enhance its maritime 
defensive capabilities and to deter piracy and maritime terrorism.223 On the other hand, 
Saudi Arabia has invested in the development of medium and large surface assets—as 
well as air forces—to improve its defense competence. Its ships are more modern, 
stronger, and have remarkably impressive amphibious capabilities.224 However, they are 
less proficient and prepared for effective use. Bahrain and Qatar are expanding their air 
and naval capabilities. While nearly all Gulf States are improving their naval and surface 
assets, they do not have sufficient resources and the will to form a strong collective 
maritime defense.  
In addition, they have not fully exploited such options as sustainment, 
interoperability, and force multipliers. The individual state efforts could be integrated to 
improve their effectiveness in providing regional maritime security. The widespread 
attempts to improve naval and air strength among the GCC states indicates their 
realization that such a move would be necessary to safeguard maritime resources. Hence, 
launching a similar project on a regional basis would acquire widespread support. 
However, the need to move faster in this direction does not need more emphasis than the 
fact that Iran has the most well-equipped navy force in the Gulf whose capabilities 
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Naval Ships and Boats 
  Iran GCC KSA UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle SDVs 8             
Submarines 3             
Midget Submarines 12             
Major Missile Combat 5 11 2 3   2   
Major Other Combat 1             
Missile Patrol 57 9 8 4 10 3 7 
Other Patrol 76 17 6 4   8 10 
Armed Boat 117 39 16       11 
Mine 7 7 2         
Landing Craft 14 8 28 9   5   
Amphibiuos Ships 17         1 1 
Support 26 5 3 4 1 5   
Total 343 96 65 24 11 24 29 
Naval Aviation Helicopter 
AH-64   12 30   12     
AS-565   15 7         
AS-532 Exocet   12           
SA-342 HOT     10   13   11 
AH-1J 50             
AH-1E       22       
SH-3D 10             
Commando Exocet             8 
AS-332 Exocet     7         
RH-53D 3             
Total 63 39 54 22 25 0 19 
Table 4. Iran-GCC Naval Assets.
226
 
Governing a comprehensive regional maritime security is a complex issue that 
requires proper planning and structuring to be effective. The GCC could adopt the 
European Union model of governance since it has proved to be effective and acceptable 
to the international community.227 This model has different operational levels. The first 
level of cooperation is intended to handle soft security, and social and economic matters, 
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that do not involve the military. This level would aim at preparing the way for higher 
levels of cooperation that are required to manage an effective maritime security strategy. 
A wide range of marine security issues could be handled at this level. These include 
search and rescue, prevention of illegal fishing, waste disposal, oil spill management, sea 
transport issues, and the management of the coastal zone. Cooperation at this level would 
include information sharing, communication, the and the collecting and sharing of 
intelligence at state and regional levels to keep the organization updated on matters 
pertaining to marine security.  
The second level of marine governance would consist of a cooperative framework 
for combating criminal activities that may threaten trade activities at the Gulf coast and at 
sea. These include piracy, drug and human trafficking, and the smuggling of weapons. 
This level may involve the extension of regional maritime security to cover the Aden and 
the Arabian seas, hence increasing access to Indian Ocean transport routes.228 To ensure 
effectiveness at this level, the GCC states need to form a regional coast guard or navy to 
ensure maritime security. Finally, the third level of cooperative maritime security would 
focus on strategic security whose purpose is to prevent miscommunication and 
misunderstandings among maritime forces that could result in unnecessary military 
clashes. Establishing trust among the GCC states will help to alleviate any conflicting 
interests that could stand in the way of building a comprehensive regional maritime 
security.229   
Protecting seaports and other maritime resources should be part of a grand plan to 
safeguard the whole Gulf region from all forms of security threats. Indeed, a maritime 
security unit could be integrated into the existing Peninsula Shield Forces as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to make the force more useful. However, this would not work 
without ironing out issues affecting the Peninsula Shield Force itself. The force was 
established in 1986 with a view to signify a landmark progress towards military 
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cooperation and ultimately a collective defense.230 However, the force proved ineffective 
in 1990 for failing to prevent Iraq from invading Kuwait.231 The main challenge that the 
GCC states should address is how to bring together their different ideas of how a joint 
defense force should operate and arrive at a consensus. This is because lack of consensus 
on this matter has rendered the Peninsula Shield Force ineffective. While Saudi Arabia 
and Oman have held the view that the force would become competent enough to help 
resolve the regional conflict problem, other GCC states discredit the force because of its 
past failures, hence limiting any cooperative effort to improve the force.232 There are also 
concerns among the smaller GCC states that the Peninsula Shield Force is not essentially 
a joint force due to the high percentage of Saudi and UAE forces. As such, these states do 
not feel that they are invested in the force equally. Under such conditions, it would be 
even more difficult to expand the force based on equal state contributions since the states 
have different capabilities. These perceptions should be discarded because the collective 
initiative would succeed if individual states were willing to compromise part of their 
pride or sovereignties for the common good. 
G. STRATEGY VI: EXPLORING ALLIANCE WITH TURKEY 
The capability of Turkey to contribute towards peace-building in the Middle East 
is growing rapidly.233 The country has undergone tremendous political, legal, and 
economic reforms in the past few decades, including the challenge of fulfilling the 
criteria for joining the EU. In addition, the country has adopted more liberal domestic and 
foreign policies to replace its decades-old, cold-war-like strategies. Turkey can 
participate in providing regional security through role-modeling. The Gulf States have 
been used to a system characterized by conflicts, economic turmoil, and authoritarianism. 
Since Turkey has emerged out of this system to join the EU system—characterized by 
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democracy, economic empowerment, and stability—the country could provide the 
influence needed to promote reform in other states. Turkey has also indicated its 
willingness to participate in diplomatic arrangements to promote peace in the region, 
especially towards solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it did not participate in the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq, Turkey helped to mobilize regional support for a better Iraq 
state.234 For instance, Turkey has conducted several meetings with Iraq’s neighbors 
including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait to lobby for regional cooperation on the 
question of Iraq.  
Alliance with Turkey would ease the GCC’s burden of solving the security 
equation in the Gulf region, especially possible threats from Iran and Iraq. Turkey has a 
long history of absenting itself from Gulf issues. Indeed, following the collapse of 
Ottoman rule during the First World War, Turkey’s relations with Gulf nations 
deteriorated.235 However, since the mid-1980s, Turkey began to open up relations with 
the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, in a bid to explore new markets. Since then, 
there has been a steady growth in Turkey’s investment in the Gulf.236 It has quadrupled 
from U.S.$2.1 billion in 2002 to U.S.$8 billion in 2009. Gulf corporations have also 
invested billions of dollars in Turkey’s economy, especially in banks, real estate, 
education, and health institutions.237 Another important sign of a possible alliance with 
Turkey was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and 
Bahrain in 2005 aimed at improving economic cooperation, information sharing, and 
exchange of technological know-how. In addition, a huge step towards a GCC-Turkey 
alliance was the declaration by GCC foreign ministers that Turkey is a strategic partner, 
followed by the signing of a memorandum of understanding to support dialogue on 
economic, political, and security matters in 2008.  
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These developments in GCC relations with Turkey demonstrate that Turkey is a 
potentially viable player in the future of Gulf regional security. What then are Turkey’s 
capabilities? According to 2009 statistics, Turkey is the 15th most prosperous economy 
worldwide.238 The country is endowed with sufficient human capital for military 
developments and has the largest army in the European Union. Turkey’s defense is quite 
strong and its involvement in international operations is increasing. These strengths 
indicate that Turkey can contribute significantly towards securing the Gulf region. 
However, its exact role in the GCC must not be that of an external security provider 
because: first, the state is not fully equipped to do so; and second, such an approach could 
jeopardize its relations with Iran. Instead, Turkey can bridge the gap between the GCC 
and the European states through its relations with NATO. One indicator of a movement 
in this direction is Turkey’s role in the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation (ICI), 
intended to strengthen NATO-Middle East relations, in 2004.239 Such ties would help to 
strengthen the access to external military support that the GCC requires to ensure stability 
in the region as it develops long-term security strategies. In addition, Turkey can 
strengthen the GCC states through the sharing its century-old experience in state 
building. Turkey’s state institutions are more established and stable in relation to those of 
the relatively new Gulf States; hence the country can serve as a role model to the GCC 
states.240 Strengthening the GCC states is essential in securing the Gulf region because it 
will promote cooperation based on common interest. 
H. STRATEGY VII: EXPLOIT OMAN’S GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN 
FOR THE COMMON GOOD 
Oman has pursued exemplary foreign policies that have kept it on good terms 
with Iran and Iraq despite the many conflicts that have swept across the Middle East 
region over the last four decades. Between 1970 and 1975, Oman took a pragmatic 
approach in response to Iran’s ambitious attempts to assert its dominion in the Arab 
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world, culminating in the seizure of two United Arab Emirates’ islands. Oman, realizing 
its weakness, acknowledged Iran’s regional dominion and sought its military support in 
crushing the Dhufar rebellion.241 During the same period, Oman entered into a border 
agreement with Iran on the Strait of Hormuz, which enabled Oman to receive direct 
support from Iran in ending internal instability. Between 1976 and 1980, Oman focused 
on building its economy after successfully ending civil conflict and the Dhufur war. To 
do so, Oman sought to expand its relations with other Gulf States, the wider Middle East 
region, and the United States.242 It also maintained its cordial relations with Iran despite 
the instability in the region that led many Arab states, including Iran, into breaking their 
diplomatic ties with Egypt. Further, Oman passed the 1981–1985 Iran-Iraq “war test” by 
not siding with either of the two warring nations, and hence maintaining its regional and 
external ties. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Oman helped to quell the war, retaining its ties 
with the two countries.243  
These and other accomplishments demonstrate Oman’s capability to play a 
mediatory role in enabling the GCC to achieve long-term regional security goals. Oman 
seems to realize that pulling away from Iran will only complicate the process of 
achieving both regional security and internal security since Iran is a major economic and 
political actor in the region.244 Therefore, if the GCC wishes to pursue soft power 
policies to contain Iran, Oman would be best suited to do so. Although Oman relates with 
Iran for individual reasons, such relations could be expanded if the GCC wishes to 
minimize possible confrontations with Iran. However, relations with Iran must be 
handled with care in the meantime due to a possible clash with the United States. Since 
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the United States is currently the main external security provider to the Gulf region, the 
GCC cannot pursue questionable diplomatic ties with their guarantor’s enemy. 
I. STRATEGY VIII: TRANSITIONING TO GULF UNION 
According to constructivists like Wendet, the role of geography is one of the most 
facilitating factors for the emergence of a shared identity. He believes that geography can 
lead to establish integration and form collective security among member states in a region 
like that of the GCC. Geography, that Arabian Gulf divided the two blocs, could be 
another cause for disintegrations between the GCC States and Iran.245 
The GCC is in the process of transitioning to a union, according to a proposal by 
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulla during the GCC’s 32nd Summit.246 GCC leaders agreed that 
forming a union of member states would enhance their capability to address the 
challenges facing the GCC, especially security threats. Within the union, GCC leaders 
will be able to enforce reform strategies such as: protection of their citizens from 
violation of rights, the strengthening of democracy, and the fight against discrimination. 
These elements are necessary in promoting public acceptance of collective initiatives 
such as a unified defense and economy. Strengthening the ties within GCC states is 
crucial in promoting the ability of the organization to address security issues affecting the 
Gulf region. This cannot be achieved while the GCC remains in the cooperation stage; 
instead, it should transition to a Gulf Union as soon as possible.247 During the summit, 
the GCC states expressed their willingness to increase commitment to matters of regional 
security by working together to combat foreign incitement and sectarianism. A stronger 
Gulf Union will be better equipped to handle the tough political challenge of crisis 
management in the region by maintaining a workable balance of power.248 The shared 
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interests among the GCC states—such as common currency, religion, and customs law—
should be adequate incentives to accelerate the process of transitioning to the Gulf Union.  
Country Name of SWF Established Estimated  in Billions 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) 1952 $270 
UAE  
(Abu Dhabi) 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 1976 $500 - $875 
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) 1984 $12 
Mubadala Development Company 2002 $10 
UAE  
(Dubai) 
Istithmar World 2003 $12 
Dubai International Capital 2004 $13 
Investment Corporation of Dubai 2006 $82 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 1953 $213 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2005 $60 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 $13 
Total $1560 
Table 5. GCC states Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). 
249
 
The Gulf Union would be the right step towards effective security and economic 
policies. The GCC could exploit the soft power as a tool of influence in both politics and 
economics. The economic diversification, media, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), 
common, and global markets are examples of soft power. The GCC collectively holds in 
its Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) more than 1.5 trillion dollars, which accounts for 52% 
of the non-pension SWF. In addition, members of GCC like Qatar has Al Jazeera, and the 
UAE along with Saudi Arabia have al-Arabiya, which are the leading news channels—
not only for the Middle East but also competing with famous international media and 
news channels. Utilizing such tools, the Gulf Union would be the main hub of business 
and media. 
                                                 
249Edwin M. Truman, “A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices,” Policy Brief 08–3, 
(Washington,D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2008), own assessments. 
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J. STRATEGY IX: ESTABLISHMENT OF STRATEGIC OIL RESERVES 
THROUGH PARTNERSHIP WITH OECD STATES 
Partnership with a member state of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) could provide GCC states with opportunities for establishing 
alternative oil reserves and boost the region’s energy security. The United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) is strategically positioned to mediate the process of establishing such a 
partnership. 
The UAE’s close relations with the international community and its individual 
contributions towards solving the Iran problem demonstrates that it is capable of 
expanding the GCC’s capability to provide security to the region. Its relations with Japan 
and the United States, both of which are members of the OECD, could open more 
opportunities for the GCC to secure its energy supplies, among other benefits. Currently, 
Abu Dhabi is working on an arrangement to establish oil storage facilities in Japan, 
where it exports most of its oil. Under this arrangement, the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC) will develop crude oil reserves in Japan’s Kiire Oil Terminal to hold 
more than 600000 kilolitres of crude as a measure to gain energy security.250 The project 
will enable Abu Dhabi to establish stronger trade ties with the East Asian oil market. 
Japan will also benefit by maintaining oil reservoirs at home that it can access in times of 
shortage.  
 This is a great opportunity, not only for UAE, but also the whole Gulf region 
through the GCC to strengthen its energy security and minimize dependence on the 
unsecure Strait of Hormuz. By entering into a partnership agreement with the UAE, the 
GCC could access more energy security options, such as the channeling of its oil through 
the UAE to storage facilities in Japan and probably the United states. Since Japan and 
other members states of the International Energy agency are required to store at least 90 
days equivalent of net oil imports, the GCC states stand a high chance of obtaining 
                                                 
250 “New Joint project on oil storage with the emirate of Abu Dhabi – commencement of the 
project, stock the crude oil produced by Abu Dhabi in Japan,” 2009. Accessed February 9, 2012. 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20090625_02.html  
 89 
storage facilities in foreign countries. 251 The idea of insuring Gulf oil by establishing 
safe storage facilities abroad is not entirely novel. For instance, Saudi Arabia had 
previously attempted to launch such a project with the United States.252 With its wider 
influence on the other GCC states, Saudi Arabia would be better placed to mobilize other 
Gulf States to launch a collective oil storage plan in partnership with the UAE and its 
external trade partners. 
                                                 
251 IEA, “IEA response system for oil supply Emergencies,” International Energy Agency, 2011. 
Accessed February 10, 2012.  http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/rs/response_system.pdf 
252 Tamsin Carlisle, “Japan may store Abu Dhabi oil,” The National , June 25, 2009 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/japan-may-store-abu-dhabi-oil  
 90 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdulla, Abdul Khaleq. “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature, Origin, and Process.” In 
Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, edited by 
Michael Hudson. 150–170. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History Of Modern Iran. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company ADNOC. “Habshan - Fujairah Pipeline; the Genius 
Vision and the Unique Location.” ADNOC News August 2011: 18–21. Accessed 




Al Arabiya News, “Iran warns Gulf states not to compensate for oil shortfalls after 
Western sanctions: Report”, January 15, 2012. 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/15/188401.html. 
 
Alani, Mustafa. “Toward a Comprehensive Maritime Security Arrangement in the Gulf.” 
Middle East: 31–42.  
 
Alasfoor, Reyadh. The Gulf Cooperation Council: its nature and achievements : a 
political analysis of regional integration of the GCC states 1979–2004. Lund: 
Department of Political Science, Lund University, 2007. 
http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Alasfoor.pdf  
 
Alexander, L. M. “GEOGRAPHY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA," Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1968), 177–197. 
 
Allison, Marissa. and Anthony H. Cordesman. U.S. and Iranian strategic competition 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 




Alterman, Jon. “The Gulf States and the American Umbrella,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2000, electronic version. 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a8.html  
 
Al-Yousif, Y.K. Oil Economies and Globalization: The Case of the GCC Countries, paper 
presented at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Economic Association, 
vol. 6, 2004. Accessed November 18, 2011.    
http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/al-yousif.pdf    
 92 
 
Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S.. Iran and the Gulf: a search for stability. Abu Dhabi, UAE: 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996. 
 
Amin, S. H.. “The Regime of International Straits: Legal Implications for the Strait of 
Hormus,” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 12, No. 3 (April 1981). 
 
Aras, Bulent. “Turkey and the GCC: An emerging relationship.” Middle East Policy 12 
no. 4 (Winter 2005): 89–97. http://www.bulentaras.com/fp/files/mepgccarticle.pdf  
 
Associated Press. “Iran begins 10-day naval navy drill in international waters near 
strategic oil route.” The Washington post, December 24, 2011. Accessed 




Awas, Aish. Exporting the gulf oil through Yemen’s ports on the Arabian sea coastline: 
Obstacles and incentives. Sheba Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. Accessed 
February 8, 2012.  http://www.shebacss.com/docs/PolicyAnalysis/scssepa014–
10.pdf  
 
Bahgat, Gawdat. "Persian Gulf Security at the Turn of the Century: Opportunities and 
Challenges," Defense Analysis 15, no. 1 (1999). 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713604658  
 
Barzegar, Kayhan. “Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: an. Iranian View”. Middle 




———— . “Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy After Saddam,” The Washington Quarterly, 
January 2010, 33:1, 173–189 
http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_barzegar.pdf  
 
———— . "Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the 
Persian Gulf.", August 5, 2008. 
 
Bazargan, Darius. “Iran: Politics, The Military and Gulf Security.” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 1, no. 3 (September 1997). 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a4.html. 
 
Birol,  Baskan. “Turkey-GCC relations: is there a future?” Insight Turkey: vol. 13, no. 1, 
(January-March 2011): 159–173. 
 
 93 
Bittle, Scott and Rochkind J. “Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index: Energy. 
Economy NewFocal Points for Anxiety over U.S. Foreign Policy”. William 
Foundation: USA, Volume 6, Spring 2008.  
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/5664.pdf  
 
Cacuci, D. G.. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Volume I: Theory, Boca Raton, FL: 
Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2003. 
 
Carlisle, Tamsin. “Japan may store Abu Dhabi oil,” The National , June 25, 2009. 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/japan-may-store-abu-dhabi-oil 
 
Center for Security Issues. Energy Security: Oil Shortages and Their Implications, CSS 
Analyses in Security Policy, Vol.1(2), 2006. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency CIA. The World Factbook: Field Listing; GDP per capita 
(PPP), 2011.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.  
 
Chapter 10, Article 152 of the translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 
the International Constitutional Law Project at the University of Bern. 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html  
 
Cheng, Paul Y.; Singhal, Mansi; Bharat, Saurabh; Khoo, Cheng; Haskins, Lucy., "Global 
Oil Choke Points," Global Equity Research, Energy & Power, Integrate Oil 
Sector View. Lehman Brothers, New York, 2008. 28–31. Accessed November 9, 
2011. http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf  
 
Central Intelligence Agency CIA. The World Factbook: Field Listing; GDP per capita 
(PPP), 2011.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html  
 
Cirincione, Joseph, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly arsenals: nuclear, 
biological, and chemical threats. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2005. 
 
CNN Wire Staff, “Oil minister: Saudi Arabia can make up for Iranian crude”, CNN News 





Cohen, Ariel, David Kreutzer, William Beach, James Carafano, and John Ligon. 
Coordinated Terrorist Attacks on Global Energy Infrastructure: Modeling the 
Risks, edited by Ariel Cohen Heritage Foundation, 2011. 
 94 
Commander R. H. Kennedy. “A Brief Geographical and Hydro Graphical Study of Straits 
Which Constitute Routes for International Traffic,” A/CONF.13/6 and Add.1, 
extract from Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 




Cordesman Anthony H. Global Oil Security: Risks by Region and Supplier. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 13, 2006. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/061101_burke_globoil.pdf  
 
———— . Iran, oil, and the Strait of Hormuz. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2007. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf.  
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. and Ahmed Hashim. Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment. 
Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997. 
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. and Alexander Wilner. IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY 
BALANCE–I  The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions. Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, February 20, 2012. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf  
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. and Aram Nerguizian. The Gulf military balance in 2010 an 
overview. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/100422_GulfMilBal.pdf  
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran's developing military capabilities. Washington, D.C.: CSIS 
Press, 2005. 
 
———— . Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and other intelligence and 
paramilitary forces. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf  
 
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan,  Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if 
Diplomacy Fails, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy April 7, 2006. 22–39. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060407_irannucoptions.pdf  
 
———— . The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War. Washington, DC: 






Cronin, Stephanie, Nur Masalha. “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC States: 
Revolution to realpolitik?”, London School of Economic and Political Science 
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf 




Dadwal, Shebonti. “Oil price crisis: implications for Gulf producers,” Strategic Analysis, 
23:1, 1999, 151–166. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09700169908455035 
  
Dahl, Erik J. “Naval Innovation: from Coal to Oil,” Joint Force Quarterly 27 (Winter 
2000–01): 50–56. Accessed November 11, 2011.  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1327.pdf  
 
Das, Mounita. “A game changer in the pipeline,” Gulf Oilfield News, Volume 6, issue 3, 
(July – September 2011). Accessed February 9, 2011. 
http://gulfoilfieldnews.oilandgaspages.com/Magazines/GONJuly-Sep2011.pdf 
 
de Boer,  Lucinda Ruth. “Analysing Iran’s Foreign Policy: The Prospects and Challenges 
of Sino-Iranian Relations,” Research Project: The Political Economy of Energy. 
Amsterdam, July 2009. Accessed December 13, 2011.  
http://www.iias.nl/epa/files/Lucinda_de_Boer.pdf  
 
Deutch, John. “Oil and Gas Energy Security Issues, Resources for the Future,” 
Backgrounder June 2010.                                                       
http://nepinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/RFF-NEPI-Deutch-OilGas.pdf  
 
Donohue, Thomas J., and James L. Jones. Energy security in the 21st Century facts, 
choices, and challenges. Washington, DC: Institute for 21st Century Energy, 
2009. 
 
Early, Bryan. “Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Strategic 
Lessons from the United Arab Emirates.” The Nonproliferation Review 17(2), 
(2010): 259–280. 
 
Ehteshami, Anoush. The Rise and Impact of Irans Neocons, edited by Anoush Ehteshami 









Esquivel, James M.. Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: varying levels of interdiction. 
Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1997. 
 
Fellers, Gordon. "Where are the World’s Oil Transit Chokepoints?" Pipeline & Gas 
Journal 231, no. 6 (2004): 41–43. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Mark. “Lessons Learned From Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” The Non 
proliferation Review, vol. 13, no. 3, November 2006, 527–537. 
 
Foley, Sean. “Turkey and the Gulf states in the twenty-first century,” Middle East Review 
of International Affairs 14 no. 3 (2010): 29–37. 
 
FRANCESCHINI, GIORGIO AND DANIEL MÜLLER., Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 




Gargash, Anwar. “Iran, the GCC States, and the UAE: Prospects and Challenges in the 
Coming Decade,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, ed., Iran and the Gulf: A Search for 
Stability, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 
1996). 
 
Gärtner, Heinz. “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East,” Austrian Institute 
for International Affairs, April 2011. Accessed January 15, 2012. 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/heinzgartner4ec66bd720848.pdf. 
 
Gendzier , Irene. “Oil, Iraq and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” Situation 
Analysis, University of Nottingham, issue 2, spring 2003, 18–28. 
http://manghani.free.fr/sa/issue2/gendzier.pdf  
 
Gholz, Eugene, et al., “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the 
Persian Gulf,” 20 August 2008. The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security 
and Law, The University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Global Security. “Oil.” Global Security.org. Accessed July 14, 2010. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/oil.htm. 
 
Groves, Steven. “Accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Is 
Unnecessary to Secure U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms,.” Heritage 






Gulf Research Center, 'Trans-Arabia Oil Pipelines', Security and Terrorism Research 
Bulletin, Issue no. 6, August 2007.  
http://ww2.grc.to/data/contents/uploads/Issue_No_6_3564.pdf  
 
Guzansky, Yoel and Lindenstrauss, Gallia and Schachter, Jonathan. “Power, Pirates, and 
Petroleum: Maritime Choke Points in the Middle East,” Strategic Assessment, 
Volume 14, No. 2, July 2011. 
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291311767315.pdf  
 
Habibi. Nader. “The Impact of Sanctions on Iran-GCC Economic Relations,” Middle 
East Brief, Brandeis University, No. 45, November 2010. 
 
Haghshenass, Fariborz. Iran's asymmetric naval warfare. Policy Focus, no.87, 
Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008. 
Accessed February 09, 2011. 
http://www.metransparent.com/IMG/pdf/PolicyFocus87.pdf  
 
Harrald, John R. “Sea Trade and Security: An Assessment of the Post-9/11 Reaction.” 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2005):157–178. 
 
Hays, Peter L., Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Tassel. American defense policy. 7th ed. 
Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
 
Hunter, Robert E. Building Security in the Persian Gulf, edited by Robert E. Hunter 
RAND, 2010. Accessed December 8, 2011.  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG944.pdf   
 
Huntley, Wade L.. “The Context of Iranian Nuclear Aims,” in Iran in the World: The 
Nuclear Crisis in Context, edited by Wade L. Huntley & Soushiant 




International Atomic Energy Agency. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” International Atomic Energy Agency 
Board of Govenors. Accessed July 6, 2010. 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gove2004–83.pdf  
 
IEA oil market report. Paris: The International Energy Agency, October 2011. Accessed 
November 22, 2011. http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/12oct11full.pdf  
 
IEA. “IEA response system for oil supply Emergencies.” International Energy Agency, 




Jaffe, Amy Myers. “Energy Security: Implications for U.S.-China-Middle East 
Relations.” The James A. Baker III Institite for Public Policy, Rice University, 




Japan’s Ministry of  Economy, Trade and Industry. “New Joint project on oil storage with 
the emirate of Abu Dhabi – commencement of the project, stock the crude oil 
produced by Abu Dhabi in Japan,” 2009. Accessed February 9, 2012. 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20090625_02.html  
 
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30. no. 2 




Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in 
American Foreign and Defense Policy, edited by Robert Kagan Encounter Books, 
2000. 
 
Katzman, Kenneth. Iran: U.S. concerns and policy responses. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2010. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142787.pdf  
 
———— . The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003. Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 
 
———— . The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy. Congressional 
Research Service, March 10, 2011. Accessed December 20, 2011. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21852.pdf   
 
Kechichian, Joseph A.. Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
 
———— . Oman: A Unique Foreign Policy Produces a Key Player in Middle Eastern 
and Global Diplomacy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995. Accessed 
February 9, 2012. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB2501/index1.html  
  
———— . “The Beguiling Gulf Cooperation Council,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, Islam & Politics (Apr., 1988), 1052–1058. Accessed January 20, 2012. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3992695.pdf?acceptTC=true  
 
———— . “The gulf cooperation council: search for security.” Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct.1985): 853–881. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3991756.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2011).  
 
 99 
Kent, H. S. K. "The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit." The American Journal 
of International Law 48 (4), 1954, 537–553. 
 
Khajavi, Ali. "UAE Crude Pipeline to Downgrade Role of Strait of Hormuz ", European 
Energy Policy Observatory, Hellenic Center for European Studies (2010). 
Accessed February 9, 2012. 
http://www.ekemeuroenergy.org/en/index.php?view=article&catid=47:m  
 
Khaleej Times. “GCC’s Strengthening unity.” February 3, 2012. Accessed February 9, 
2010.  http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/editorial/ 
 
Khan, Sabahat. Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz plausibility and key 
considerations. Dubai Media City, Dubai: Institute of Near East and Gulf Military 




Khan, Saira. Iran and nuclear weapons protracted conflict and proliferation. London: 
Routledge, 2010. 
 
Khan, Tanvir A. “GCC union will  keep region stable.” GulfNews, February 4, 2012. 
Accessed February 10, 2012.   http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/gcc-
union-will-keep-region-stable-1.956809   
 
Khaniha, Nasrin and Zahra Pishgahi Fard. “Globalization and Important Straits”. In: The 
Social Sciences. Volume 4, Issue 3, 2009, 304–312. 
 
Kilian, Lutz. The economic effects of energy price shocks. London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, 2007. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/jel052407.pdf  
 
Koch, Christian. “The GCC as a Regional Security Organization.” Konrad Adenaur 
Stiftung KAS International Reports. November 2010. 24–35. 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21076–544–2-30.pdf?101110141517  
 




r Sozialwissenschaften, 2009.  Kraemer, Thomas D.  Addicted to oil strategic implications of American oil policy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006.  
Kraig, Michael. "Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks for the Persian Gulf." Middle East Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): 139–156. http://vps.stanleyfoundation.org/initiatives/gsi/papers/mepc_kraig.pdf   
 100 
Krönig, Matthew. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear 
Assistance", AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 1, February 2009, 
123–133. 
 
Kuffel, Glenn P. The Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsular Shield Force. Ft. Belvoir: 
Defense Technical Information Center, February 07, 2000. Accessed November 
10, 2011.   http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA378521  
 
Kumar, Himendra Mohan. “Habshan – Fujairah oil pipeline will be ready within six 




Hunter, Robert E. Building security in the Persian Gulf. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2010. Accessed February 8, 2012.  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG944.pdf   
 
Lake, Eli. "Ayatollah: Iran’s military will ‘punch’ West."Washington Times, February 09, 




———— .  “Iran Threatens Strait of Hormuz,” The New York Sun, August 5, 2008. 
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/iranthreatens-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz/83142/  
 
Le Billon,P, El Khatib, Fouad. “From free oil to 'freedom oil': terrorism, war and U.S. 
Geopolitics in the Persian Gulf” Geopolitics, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2004. 
http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/freedomoil.pdf 
 
Legrenzi, Matteo. “Did the GCC Make a Difference? Institutional Realities and 
(Un)intended Consequences.” In Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, 
Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East, edited by Cilja Harders and 
Matteo Legrenzi, 107–122. England: Ashgate, 2008. 
 
Looney, Robert E., "The Gulf Co-operation Council's Cautious Approach to Economic 
Integration," Journal of Economic Cooperation 24, no. 2 (2003). 
 
Lun, Y. H. V., Kee Lai, and T. C. E. Cheng. Shipping and logistics management. 
London: Springer, 2010. 
 
MacDonald, C. G. "Irans Strategic Interests and the Law of the Sea." Middle East 
Journal 34, vol. 34, no. 3, Summer 1980, 302–322. 
 
Mahan, Alfered Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783. Boston: 
Little Brown, 1890. 
 101 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT., The future of nuclear fuel cycle:  an 
interdisciplinary MIT study. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2011.  http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/documents/nuclear-
fuel-ycle/The_Nuclear_Fuel_Cycle-all.pdf  
 
Miller Benjamin. “The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East,” 
in TV Paul, Jim Wirtz and Michel Fortmann eds., Balance of Power: Theory and 
Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press), 2004, 239–266. 
 
Miller, J. Berkshire. “Omani Road to Iran.” The Diplomat, November 4, 2011. Accessed 
February 9, 2012.  http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/11/04/the-
omani-road-to-iran/  
 
Mills, Rodney A.. Iran and the Strait of Hormuz saber rattling or global energy 
nightmare?. Newport: Naval War College, 2008.  http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494366  
 
Momani, Bessma. “Gulf Cooperation Council Oil Exporters and the Future of the 
Dollar.” New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2008. 293–314. 
 
Mundale, John E. “Presidential Use of Forces in Defense of Key Shipping Chokepoints: 
the Suez, the Gulf and the Future,” United States Coast guard Academy. Accessed 
January 29, 2012. 
http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Calkins/Mundale.pdf  
 
Navias, Martin S. and E. R. Hooton. Tanker Wars : The Assault on Merchant Shipping 
during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988. Library of International Relations. 
London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996. 
 
Nincic, Donna J. “Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce 
Resources,” in Globalization and Maritime Power. edited by Tangredi, Sam J. 
Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002. 
 
Nonneman, Gerd. Terrorism, Gulf security and Palestine: key issues for an EU-GCC 
dialogue. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2002. 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/02_02p.pdf  
 
Noorbaksh, Mahdi. “Religion, Politics, and Ideological Trends in Contemporary Iran.” 
Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, edited by Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi (1996): 
15–46. 
 
Nordhaus, William D. “The Economics of an Integrated World Oil Market.” Address 
prepared for Annual Conference of Energy Information Agency, 2009, and June 
2009 meeting of International Energy Workshop. Venice, Italy, June 17–19, 2009. 
http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents/iew_052909.pdf  
 102 
Noyes, James. “Iran's Nuclear Program: Impact on the Security of the GCC.” Iran’s 
Nuclear Program: Realities and Repercussions. Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research, 2006. 
 
O'Neil, William D., and Caitlin Talmadge. "Correspondence: Costs and Difficulties of 
Blocking the Strait of Hormuz." International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 
2008/09): 190–198. 
 
Ottaway, Marina. Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: the elusive regional policy. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009. Accessed 
December 20, 2011.  http://carnegieendowment.org/files/iran_us_gulf1.pdf  
 
Peele, Reynolds B. “The Importance of Maritime Chokepoints.” Parameters  Summer 
1997, 61–74.  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/welcome.html   
 
Peterson, Erik R.., The Gulf Cooperation Council: search for unity in a dynamic region. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 
 
Peterson, J. E.  “Life After Oil: Economic Alternatives for the Arab Gulf States.” 




Pham, Peter J.. “Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” American 
Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 32 no.2,  2010, 64–74. 
 
Pollack, Kenneth M. “Securing the Gulf.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2003): 
2–16. Accessed November 21, 2011. 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20033645.  
 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. International Straits of the World: The Persian Gulf and the 
Strait of Hormuz. International Straits of the World 3. Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, 1979. 
 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K., and Joseph A. Kechichian. The Gulf Cooperation Council: 
record and analysis. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988. 
 
RAND, “Oman: a unique foreign policy,” January 25, 2012. Accessed February 9, 2012. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB2501/index1.html   
 
Ratner, Michael. and Neelesh Nerurkar. Middle East and North Africa Unrest: 
Implication for Oil and Natural Gas Markets, Congressional Research Service, 
March 10, 2011.  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41683.pdf  
 
 103 
Richardson, Michael. “Asia's Middle East Oil Dependence: Chokepoints on a Vital 
Maritime Supply Line,” Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, March 
2007. Accessed November 12, 2011.  http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr12007.pdf   
 
Rear Adm. Khan Hasham Bin Saddique, “Challenges in Indian Ocean,” Maritime 




Rivlin, Paul. World oil and energy trends: strategic implications for the Middle East. Tel 
Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2000. 
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291190278091.pdf  
 
Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. “Straits, Passages and Chokepoints: A Maritime Geostrategy of 
Petroleum Distribution.”Cahiers de Géographie du Québec, vol. 48, no. 135, 
December, 2004, 357–74.  http://people.hofstra.edu/jean-
paul_rodrigue/downloads/CGQ_strategicoil.pdf   
 
Rodrigue, Jean, and Michael Browne. Chapter 10: International Maritime Freight 
Movements, in R.D. Knowles, J. Shaw and I. Docherty (eds) Transport 
Geographies: Mobilities, Flows and Spaces, London: Blackwell, 2008. 
 
Russell, James A..  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East 
directions and policy options in the new century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006.  
 
———— . “Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma.” Middle East 
Policy XII, no. 3 (2005): 64–78. 
 
———— . Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's 
Middle East. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007. 
 
Sadjadpour, Karim. Reading Khamenei the world view of Iran's most powerful leader. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. Accessed 
February 21, 2012. 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf  
 
———— . The battle of Dubai the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran cold war. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf   
 
Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 
edited by Scott D. Sagan W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1995. 
 
 104 
Sandwick, John A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an 
Interdependent World; Foreword by George McGovern, edited by John A. 
Sandwick Westview, 1987. 
 
Saxton, Jim. The Strait of Hormuz and the Threat of an Oil Shock, A Joint Committee 
Study, 2007. 
 
Schnars, Brenna L.. The idle threat? an assessment of the economic, military and 
strategic consequences of an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Monterey, 
California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/schnars-2010.pdf  
 
Slackman, Michael. "Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb Fuel."New York Times, 
February 11, 2010. Accessed in December 27, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/world/middleeast/12iran.html 
 
———— . “Oman navigates between Iran and Arab Nations,” New York Times, May 16, 
2009.  Accessed February 9, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/world/middleeast/16oman.html?pa  
 
Stansfield, Gareth. Gulf Security Following the Invasion of Iraq. Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, 2008. 
 
Talmadge, C. “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz.” 
International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer, 2008): 82–117. 
 
Tangredi, Sam J. ed., Globalization and Maritime Power. Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2002. 
 
Tasman, ACIL. Petroleum import infrastructure in Australia – Main Report prepared for 
the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, August 2009. 
 
The Baker Institute Study. Iran and its strategic role in the Persian Gulf: policy options 
for the United States. Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy 
of Rice University, Baker Institute Study No. 7, (June 1998). Accessed February 
20, 2012. http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/PolicyReports/study_7.pdf  
 
The Commander's handbook on the law of naval operations. July2007. Reprint, 
Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's strategic weapons 
programmes: a net assessment.. London, UK: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Truman, Edwin M.. A blueprint for sovereign wealth fund best practices. Washington, 
DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008. 
 105 
U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: 
Strait of Hormuz.” U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent 
Statistics and Analysis. Accessed October 13, 2011. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html.  
 
Ulrichsen, K. C.. The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power.,  Occasional 
Paper No. 6, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University 
School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2010. 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), December 10, 1982. 




U.S. Department of State: Country Report on Terrorism, Chapter 3, State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Overview, 30 April 2007.  
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm 
 
Vaidya, Sunil K. “Iran and Oman to provide security for the Strait of Hormuz,” Gulf 




Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy 
110, Spring 1998, 29–46. 
 
Wehrey, Frederic, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, 
Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the 
Domestic Roles of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, edited by Frederic 
Wehrey RAND, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf  
 
World Energy Outlook 2006, Paris: International Energy Agency, 2006. Accessed  
February 24,2011.  www.worldenergyoutlook.org/summaries2006/English.pdf 
 
World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris: International Energy Agency, 2011. Accessed  
February 24,2011. http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/weo2011sum.pdf  
 
Yaphe, Judith S.. Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: How Should the United States 
Respond? (Strategic Forum, Number 237, November 2008). Ft. Belvoir: Defense 
Technical Information Center, 2008. 
 
Yergin, Daniel. The quest: energy, security and the remaking of the modern world. New 
York: Penguin Press, 2011. 
 
 106 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 107 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
